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ABSTRACT
An Evaluation Between Confidence 
Judgments and Differences in 
Monitoring Ability
by
Brett Douglas Campbell
Dr. Alice Corkill 
Associate Professor of Educational Psychology 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Metacognition is the awareness of a person's thinking and the ability to regulate 
that thinking. This study examines how confident a person is at monitoring progress 
during two cognitive tasks. The first task was the feeling-of-knowing paradigm, when 
participants judge how accurately they can retrieve an answer in a recognition task, when 
they cannot retrieve the answer in free recall. The second task was a paired-associate 
interference paradigm. Participants were presented with a list o f noun-noun pairs twice 
and then a new list was presented for recall. Participants were placed into three groups 
(high, medium, low)based on responses to the Metacognitive Awareness Inventory. 
Results showed no significant differences between groups in either task. The results are 
discussed in terms of measuring strategy knowledge instead of monitoring.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
Metacognition has been defined as knowledge and control over personal cognitive 
faculties and content (Brown. 1987; Flavell. 1987, Flavell & Wellman. 1977; Swanson. 
1990). Flavell (1987) described metacognition as a model of cognitive monitoring, 
denoting the cognitive and affective experiences involved. He further indicated that self- 
analysis leads to planning and leaming from such reflective experiences.
The first comprehensive theory of metacognition was published in 1979 (Flavell). 
The theory was based on previous research in cognition. Metacognition research has 
become one of the most popular research areas involving child development, education, 
and counseling. It has been related to reading comprehension (e.g. Brown. 1975. 1978), 
problem solving (e.g. Brown, 1987; Comoldi. 1998; Davidson. Deuser & Sternberg. 
1994), and storage and retrieval tasks (e.g. Nelson, 1984; Pressley, Borkowski & Sullivan. 
1985).
Flavell compared metacognition to Piaget's reflective abstraction. As an individual 
becomes increasingly aware of their cognitive abilities, they gauge their capacity for 
storing information in retrieval and encoding tasks. This understanding of personal 
abilities and limitations occurs in both formal teaching environments and through self-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
reflection. Piaget defined reflective abstraction as “an internal mechanism of reflection on 
its reflection” (as cited in Montangero & Maurice-Naville, 1997).
Metacognition has been divided into two components: 1 ) the knowledge of 
personal cognitive abilities and processes and 2) the ability to control and modify these 
cognitive activities (Brown. 1987: Corkill & Koshida, 1993; Flavell. 1987; Jacobs & Paris. 
1987; Schraw & Moshman. 1995). Knowledge, or awareness, about cognitive abilities and 
processes has been labeled metacognitive knowledge. Controlling or regulating cognitive 
abilities and processes have been identified as metacognitive control.
The remainder of this chapter begins with a review of metacognitive knowledge. 
Research in this area has focused on the relationship between intellectual aptitude and 
metacognition and metacognitive strategy knowledge. The next section considers 
metacognitive control, investigating how metacognitive control has been measured. A 
more in-depth look at research associated with on-line monitoring as an aspect of 
metacognitive control is included. One approach to measuring metacognitive monitoring 
has been the examination of feeling-of-knowing judgments. Following is a review of the 
two current theories explaining feeling-of-knowing judgments. The justifications for the 
present study are then elaborated. Finally, there is an examination of two inventories used 
in this study—the Metacognitive Awareness Inventory and the Need for Cognition scale.
Metacognitive Knowledge 
Flavell’s metacognitive theory is examined first. A second theory of how 
metacognitive knowledge has been defined is then presented. Research into metacognitive 
knowledge can be grouped into two areas. The first is the relationship between aptitude
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
and metacognitive knowledge. A review of the work of Swanson and others examines this 
relationship. The second area is the examination of strategy knowledge.
Flavell first identified metacognitive knowledge after studying metamemory in 
children (Flavell, 1979; 1987). The initial definition of metacognitive knowledge 
suggested it was comprised of three components: person, task, and strategy variables 
(Flavell, 1979; 1987; Flavell & Wellman, 1977). Person variables identify the awareness 
people have about the contents of their memory. It also includes knowledge about how to 
best encode material to be learned and how to retrieve that material. This includes 
comparing one’s abilities to the abilities of others. Tasks variables are defined as the 
knowledge one has regarding differences between specific tasks, as well as the effects of 
storing and retrieving information according to task difficulty. Task variables include the 
ability to find relationships between sets of information or comparing the current task with 
previous mental experiences. Strategy variables include the knowledge one has of specific 
strategies learned via experience or formal training and how each strategy may apply to 
different tasks.
Others have avoided Flavell’s nomenclature, focusing on individual awareness 
instead. Metacognitive awareness is divided into declarative knowledge, procedural 
knowledge, and conditional knowledge (Chi, 1987; Gavelek & Raphael, 1982; Jacobs and 
Paris, 1987; Schraw & Dennison, 1994; Schraw & Graham, 1997). Declarative knowledge 
refers to knowledge about self and what specific factors affect performance, such as 
capacity, use of rehearsal, and availability of different strategies. Procedural knowledge 
refers to use and selection of strategies. Conditional knowledge refers to when and why an
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
individual would use declarative and procedural knowledge, including which strategies are 
effective, when they are effective, and when they are appropriate.
Swanson (1987; see also Daneman & Carpenter, 1980) compared metacognitive 
knowledge variables with intelligence in memory recall. Questionnaires, based on the 
work of Flavell measuring metacognitive knowledge, were given to children of normal and 
high intelligence. After the questionnaires were administered, two recall tasks were 
completed. In the first task, children were asked to organize a series of 15 pictures in any 
order that would help them recall the greatest number of pictures. The second task 
required the children to listen to a story and then recall as many of the story details as 
possible. Swanson found FlavelTs strategy and task variables were better predictors of 
recall than the person variable or intelligence—as determined by standardized verbal 
ability tests.
Additional research has demonstrated that metacognitive ability can compensate 
for cognitive aptitude (Swanson, 1990). Children were placed into one of four groups: 1 ) 
high intelligence, high monitoring ability; 2) high intelligence, low monitoring ability; 3) 
low intelligence, high monitoring ability; and 4) low intelligence, low monitoring ability. 
Each child then had to perform two tasks. In the first, the subject had to deduce which two 
colorless liquids would create a colored liquid from four options. In the second task, the 
child had to control the speed of a pendulum by varying the weight at the end of a string 
and by varying the length of the string. The two high metacognitive groups did better at 
both tasks than either low metacognitive group. O f the two low metacognitive ability 
groups, the high intelligence subjects performed better than those with low intelligence.
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Intellectual aptitude was considered less vital than metacognitive ability in these reasoning 
tasks.
Swanson, Chrisitie, and Rubadeau (1993) compared children who were average 
readers with children who were leaming disabled. While there were differences in reading 
comprehension, vocabulary, and reading rates, they performed similarly in metacognitive 
activities. The similarity in performance scores between average readers and those who 
were classified as leaming disabled suggested that children with leaming disabilities can 
and do use metacognitive skills to compensate for specific domain deficiencies.
Swanson and Trahan (1996) compared metacognitive differences in solving 
analogies in children between 12 and 14 years of age. The groups compared were average 
achievers, gifted, leaming disabled, and mentally retarded. The gifted children had the 
highest scores of all groups in both the metacognition inventory and solving analogies. 
Those with mental retardation performed significantly lower in metacognition scores and 
analogies. The normal and leaming disabled groups had similar scores on the analogies 
task. Individuals with leaming disabilities were able to compensate with metacognitive 
strategies; whereas, mentally retarded individuals apparently could not employ 
compensatory strategies. Flavell’s strategy knowledge, as measured by Swanson's 
inventory, was significantly correlated to success in the analogy task.
In another study, Keeler and Swanson (2001 ) examined ten-year old children with 
respect to metacognitive knowledge about math. Additional variables of interest included 
spatial and verbal ability. Subjects completed two tasks. The first, a digit sentence span 
task, required subjects to read sentences that contained several digits. Subjects were then 
asked to recall all digits from the sentences. In the second task, subjects were asked to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6study a path on a map that had no labels. The recall test required subjects to draw the path 
on a blank map. In each task subjects were given four strategies from which to choose; 
rehearsal, clustering, association, and elaboration. Interviewing the child during the task 
assessed which strategy was being used. The results suggested that only strategy 
knowledge and working memory span accounted for significant proportions of variance in 
successful completion of both tasks. Those children who stayed with one strategy during 
the task had better performance scores. However, the strategy chosen was dependent on an 
individual’s working memory span.
The utility of strategy instruction, as a metacognitive component, has been 
effectively demonstrated (e.g. Baker & Brown, 1984; Brown, 1975; 1987; Pressley & 
Ghatala, 1990; Pressley, 1995; Slife, Weiss & Bell, 1985). Strategy instruction begins to 
become effective between second and third grade (Brown, Campione, & Murphy, 1977; 
Devolder, Brigham & Pressley, 1990; Pressley, 1994; Schneider & Pressley, 1997). For 
example. Brown and colleagues trained children between the mental ages of 6 and 8 to use 
mnemonic strategies. The educable children with a mental age of 6 could only remember 
the strategy at immediate testing. Those with the mental age of 8 could remember the 
strategy when tested one year later.
Paris and Jacobs (1984) taught third and fifth grade children metacognitive 
strategies in reading comprehension. Half-hour lessons were conducted twice a week for 
the entire class for four months. Reading comprehension was measured through four tasks, 
a structured interview with the investigator, the Gates-MacGinitie reading comprehension 
test, a cloze task, and an error detection test. The cloze task consisted o f a passage with 
several words missing. The children then filled in the correct word. This task was
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7considered a measure of literal comprehension, inferential comprehension, identifying the 
main idea, and structural awareness. The error detection test consisted of a reading passage 
with several inconsistencies within the passage. Subjects were to underline those words or 
sentences that did not make sense. Children were tested in the fall and again in the spring 
of the school year. Children who received strategy instruction made the most improvement 
in reading comprehension regardless of age. Participants were divided into groups of high, 
middle, and low awareness according to their responses to the interview. Paris and Jacobs 
found the high awareness group scored the highest on the Gates-MacGintie, the cloze task, 
and the error detection test.
A follow-up study (Jacobs & Paris, 1987) examined comprehension strategies in 
third and fifth grade students. Instead of interviewing the children, they created an 
inventory. Classes were assigned to either receive strategy instruction or no strategy 
instruction. The instruction included explicit teaching of comprehension strategies, 
discussions, and practice sessions. Sixty lessons were taught over the course of a school 
year. The Gates-MacGintie standardized test was used again to ascertain reading 
awareness. Children were tested towards the end of the school year and the results were 
compared to pre-tests scores. This research found that subjects who received 
comprehension strategy instruction had greater reading awareness in both grades. As 
would be expected, the fifth grade children had higher scores than the third grade children. 
In addition, the third grade girls had higher comprehension scores than the boys.
Delclos and Harrington (1991) gave fifth and sixth grade children strategy 
instruction in solving logic problems. Students had to solve problems in a computer game 
format. Each child was placed into one of three groups: problem-solving, monitored
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gproblem solving, or a control group. The two groups receiving strategy instruction 
received two hours of instruction. The monitored group also received a booklet consisting 
o f questions designed to reinforce monitoring strategies during the practice phase. All 
three groups participated in a practice phase. Both instruction groups both outperformed 
the control group. The group receiving strategy instruction with monitoring did 
significantly better than the students receiving strategy instruction alone.
Unfortunately, children are not inclined to employ successful strategies until late 
childhood or late adolescence (Baker, 1985; Brown & Smiley, 1978; Schneider, 1998). 
Brown and Smiley (1978), for example, tested students in grade five, grades seven and 
eight, grades eleven and twelve, and college students in reading comprehension and use of 
strategies. Participants were presented with a story and then later tested on recalling the 
theme of the story. Grade eleven and twelve students and the college students were the 
most efficient at identifying themes. The seventh and eighth grade students were more 
proficient than fifth graders at the recall task, but did not do well as the oldest participants. 
When subjects were divided into spontaneous strategy or induced strategy (told to 
underline key concepts in a reading passage) and told to identify important aspects in a 
passage, the spontaneous strategy users were more proficient in identifying the key themes, 
while the induced strategy users appeared to select themes in a random fashion.
McGivem and colleagues (McGivem, Levin, Pressley, & Ghatala. 1990) divided 
second graders, seventh graders, and college students into three leaming groups: 1 ) the 
first group was explicitly taught to self-monitor, 2) the second group was given the 
monitoring instruction plus an opportunity to practice on-line monitoring, and 3) the third 
group was given no instruction. All three groups watched a video of a model leaming
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9noun pairs. The model demonstrated two strategies, repetition or elaboration. In the 
repetition strategy, subjects were shown the model repeating paired words three times. In 
the elaboration strategy, the model produced a sentence incorporating each word pair. The 
investigators interviewed the participants about each strategy. Subjects were then tested 
twice in a paired-associate paradigm. In one test, they were instructed to use the repetition 
strategy and in the second test they were instructed to use the elaboration strategy. 
Afterwards each student was asked which strategy was more useful. The college students 
suggested the elaboration strategy was more efficient than the repetition strategy. The 
seventh grade students who received instruction performed as well as the college students 
in identifying elaboration as a better strategy. The seventh grade with no instruction 
group, believed both strategies to be equally efficient. The second grade students showed 
poor strategy monitoring overall. This suggests that strategy instruction may be a necessary 
component in facilitating between two strategies in children as late as twelve and thirteen 
years old.
Son and Metcalfe (2000) examined study-time-allocation strategies. Individuals 
were tested using biographical essays and Japanese haiku. In the biography test subjects 
read eight one-paragraph biographies, then judged each biography according to how easy it 
would be to leam and how interesting each paragraph was. For those given poetry, subjects 
read 49 haikus and made ease-of-leaming judgments and judgments-of-interest. An ease- 
of-leaming judgment is a rating of how easy the subject believes the information is to 
remember or to leam. The judgment-of-interest asks subjects to indicate level of interest in 
a particular reading passage or poem. Participants were placed in either a free-reading 
condition or in a study-for-test condition. All groups were tested for recall. Students who
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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knew they would be tested focused on the material that was judged easier to leam. The 
results suggested that focusing on easier items reinforced leamed items, guaranteeing a 
higher test score.
In review, recent studies have supported FlavelTs theory of metacognitive 
knowledge by showing task and strategy variables are consistent predictors of performance 
as is cognitive aptitude. Further research maintains strategy instmction as an important 
means of conveying metacognitive knowledge. Students without explicit strategy 
instmction do not perform as well as those who do receive instmction. As students 
acquired more experience they are more able to analyze strategy and task variables. In 
addition, the research suggests that strategy instmction, strategy use, and aptitude predict 
how successfully an individual can be at a variety of cognitive tasks.
Metacognitive Control 
This section reviews the theoretical underpinnings of metacognitive control. 
Research in this area has focused on students’ use of feedback prior to or during a task.
The feedback may be self-generated or provided by another individual. Self-generated 
feedback is considered on-line monitoring. Recent research identifies individual 
differences in monitoring ability. A second area of on-line monitoring is the examination 
of feeling-of-knowledge judgments. Two theories that may explain what the feeling-of- 
knowing judgment represents are presented.
In his original conceptualization, Flavell did not elaborate on metacognitive control 
to the same degree as he did on metacognitive knowledge. Other researchers have 
identified three metacognitive control components; I ) plaiming, 2) evaluation, and 3)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
regulation (Jacobs and Paris, 1987). Planning is the mental coordination prior to initiating 
a task. Evaluation is an assessment of the individual’s understanding of the information. 
Regulation is the on-line monitoring during a task. It includes strategy assessment and 
tracking progress towards the goal of the task. This taxonomy has been adopted by others 
(Brown, 1987; Kluwe, 1987).
Schraw and his associates suggested that metacognitive regulation consists of 
planning, monitoring, and evaluating (Schraw & Dennison. 1994; Schraw & Moshman. 
1995; Schraw, 1998). Planning refers to the selection o f the appropriate strategy and 
allocation of cognitive resources. Monitoring involves analysis of present performance and 
comparing current progress to previous experiences (Chi, 1987). Evaluation is a process in 
which one determines the utility of a chosen strategy after the task has been completed. 
Much of the research in self-regulation has focused on metacognitive monitoring. Self­
regulation is the ability to scrutinize cognitive activity and make changes as needed to 
meet a specified goal.
Schunn, Lovett, and Reder (2001 ) provided feedback in an inductive reasoning 
task. Subjects were instructed to build a stick of a specified length from any combination 
or number of three different length sticks. Two strategies-overshoot and undershoot-were 
identified for each subject. Strategy use was evaluated over 70 trials. In ten trials either 
strategy would work, for 30 of the trials the overshoot strategy was more successful, and in 
30 of the trials the undershoot strategy was more successful. Subjects could choose either 
strategy in any trial. Scores were measured as the number of moves required to reach the 
desired stick length. The researchers found strategy selection inversely related to working 
memory and inductive reasoning. Subjects with strong strategy selection used reasoning
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and working memory less. This strategy awareness contributed to task automaiicity. They 
also found large individual differences in strategy selection. All subjects used both 
strategies; however, some subjects did not connect their strategy selection with their 
performance.
The researchers repeated the stick-building task with a new group of subjects, but 
without the first 10 trials where either strategy would work. The subjects were given 30 
trials requiring the undershoot strategy and thirty trials were the overshoot strategy were 
needed. Subjects determined which strategy to employ at each trial. In this study, subjects 
were more perceptive as to which strategy was more effective. Any bias for one strategy 
over another was not found. Strategy awareness was related to strategy adaptivity. Subjects 
who recognized the required change in strategy effectively made the change immediately.
Finally, four strategies where given to subjects to choose from and they were given 
a secondary task to do simultaneously with the stick building task. Subjects were placed in 
either a high-load condition or a low-load condition for the secondary task. The high-load 
condition required subjects press the “z” key on a computer console when they heard a 
letter (a or b) that was the same as the last letter or press the “x” key when the letter was 
different from the previous letter sound. The low-load condition required subjects to press 
the “z” key when they heard an “a” sound and press the “x” key when they heard the “b” 
sound. Working memory, as measured by doing two tasks at time, did not play a large role 
in strategy adaptivity. Performance was not hindered by either the high-load or low-load 
working memory condition. The relationship between awareness and adaptivity remained 
strong.
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This research provides evidence for the importance of strategy selection in a task. 
Theoretically, strategy awareness was considered to be a part of strategy adaptivity. While 
the researchers expected strategy implementation would be more implicit, implicit strategy 
use is not necessarily disconfirmed in this work.
Despite the results of this study, Schunn. Lovett, and Reder (2001 ) argue that 
regulatory processes are automatic and implicit. The argument is that during leaming the 
information to be encoded is not consciously evaluated. To support this contention. Reder 
(1996) presented subjects with a list of new names over several presentations. Subjects 
had to identify which names were famous and names which were new names. The subjects 
demonstrated high false alarm rates when the new names were embedded among famous 
names. Similar results were obtained in the failure to detect spelling errors after multiple 
exposures to misspelled words. Reder argues that the information was encoded as is and 
not evaluated for errors. In other words, subjects were engaged in implicit encoding.
The same approach has been applied to strategy selection. Subjects were given two 
choices in strategy selection in solving two-digit by two-digit arithmetic problems (Reder 
& Ritter, 1992). Subjects were given a large number of problems to solve as training.
They were then tested and made feeling-of-knowing judgments on their answers. The 
subjects could attempt to retrieve the answer from memory or compute the answer. These 
were the two strategy choices. Strategy selection was based on familiarity with the features 
of each problem. The more familiar the features, the more likely the retrieval strategy was 
attempted. Computation was used when the subject felt less familiar with the problem. 
Similar results were obtained with reading comprehension strategies (Reder, 1987). 
Subjects were given passages to read, then tested. If test items were similar to the passage
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a direct retrieval strategy was employed. However, if the questions were less like the 
passage then a plausibility strategy was used. The plausibility strategy was the relating of 
information in the passage to the inferences made by the question. These results were 
interpreted as strategy selection being automatic and implicit. This was given as evidence 
for the lack of conscious awareness of regulatory processes.
Monitoring Ability
Monitoring refers to the ongoing assessment of achievement towards a goal and the 
effectiveness of the strategy being used (Devolder, Brigham, & Pressley, 1990).
Monitoring includes personal judgments of familiarity with a task and cues regarding the 
correct answer (Koriat, 2000; Schwartz & Metcalfe, 1992). Metacognitive monitoring 
compares recent outcomes to create performance expectations. Such judgments are used to 
allocate cognitive resources for the current task, such as length and depth of memory 
search. Pressley and Ghatala ( 1990) considered cognitive monitoring to be the foundation 
of self-regulated thinking. Initially this type of assessment is thought to occur consciously. 
With time it becomes automated and conscious involvement is not required (Delclos & 
Harrington, 1990; Narens, Jameson & Lee, 1994; Pressley, Borkowski, & Schneider,
1987).
Recent research has considered individual differences in on-line monitoring ability. 
Swanson ( 1990), for example, divided children into four groups: 1 ) high intelligence, high 
metacognitive ability; 2) high intelligence, low metacognitive ability; 3) low intelligence, 
high metacognitive ability; and 4) low intelligence, low metacognitive ability. Each group 
was given two Piagetian tasks to solve. The first was an analytical task in which a colored
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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liquid was to be derived from the combination of two out of four colorless liquids. The 
second was a pendulum task, in which the child had to determine how to increase and 
decrease the speed of a pendulum by varying the weight and length of a string. Students 
who rated themselves as having high metacognitive skills outperformed others, despite 
ability. Metacognitive skills appeared to compensate for aptitude.
Corkill and Koshida (1993) found that college students with high metacognitive 
strategy awareness, as measured by the Metacognitive Awareness Questionnaire, had more 
accurate estimates of their performance with regard to aptitude tests of verbal reasoning 
and computation. Knowledge about cognition was related to accurate monitoring of test 
performance. Slife and Weaver (1992) also found a positive relationship between 
metacognitive monitoring and mathematical performance in depressed and non-depressed 
subjects. Depressed college students showed lower monitoring than the non-depressed 
students. Cognitive ability was not correlated with metacognitive monitoring.
Schraw (1994) tested monitoring ability in college students in reading 
comprehension. He found that subjects with high cognitive monitoring skills performed 
better and were more confident than subjects with low monitoring ability. Schraw 
suggested that high monitors produced better on-line, self-correcting feedback during the 
test. Contrary to other studies (Corkill & Koshida, 1993; Koriat, Lichenstein & Fischof. 
1993; Metcalfe, 1998; Pressley & Ghatala, 1990;), poor monitors appeared to realize that 
their metacognitive abilities were poor. In other words, their questionnaire scores matched 
their confidence judgments.
Schraw and colleagues (Schraw, 1994; Schraw, Dunkle. Bendixen, Roedel, 1995; 
see also Schraw, 1997; Schraw, 1998) have examined the relationship between global
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monitoring and domain specific monitoring. Global monitoring is a general ability 
applicable across all situations. Domain specific monitoring is the ability to monitor 
strategies specific to that task or domain. The domains examined were reading 
comprehension, spatial ability, and math ability. Monitoring proficiency in one domain 
was related to the monitoring ability in other domains. Proficiency remained consistent 
after domain-specific ability was controlled. When domains were matched by difficulty in 
a principle component analysis, a general monitoring skill was found (Schraw & Nietfeld.
1998). It was hypothesized that children first learn domain-specific regulatory skills and 
then generalize and adapt these skills to new situations. Schraw (1997; Schraw & Graham. 
1997) proposed that experience was what influenced the movement from domain-specific 
regulation to more global monitoring.
Feeline-of-Knowine
One of the more reliable measures of cognitive monitoring has been the feeling-of- 
knowing judgment (FOK) (Nelson, 1984; Leonesio & Nelson. 1990). First identified by 
Hart (1965), a feeling-of-knowing judgment occurs when an individual can recognize 
information that could not be recalled initially. For example, an individual would be given 
material to learn, such as noun pairs or trivia. When an item was not recalled at testing, 
the individual was asked how confident they were that they would recognize the correct 
answer. Several choices were presented from which the subject could choose the 
appropriate answer. Feeling-of-knowing judgments are indicative of performance on the 
recognition task. When judgment is high, the correct answer is typically recognized.
A number o f elements have been identified which affect the accuracy of feeling-of- 
knowing judgments. In one study, subjects were divided into four groups (Nelson.
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Leonesio. Landwehr. & Narens. 1986). Each group was presented with questions that no 
one could answer in a free recall situation. Questions were presented in random order.
The first group was shown the answer to each question for one second. The second group 
was given a perceptual identification task, in which the correct answer to each question 
was flashed on a screen at increasing durations. The subject repeated the answer when they 
could identify it fh>m the flashes. The third group was given a four-choice recognition test 
of the same 12 questions. The last group was given an eight-choice recognition test. FOK 
judgments were compared to the normative item difficulty and normative feeling-of- 
knowing for all participants. In all groups, individual FOK judgments were more accurate 
at predicting performance than the normative FOK judgments, but were not as accurate as 
item difficulty. Greater accuracy was found in the relearning group—the first group that 
was shown the answers for one second—and the two groups that received the forced-choice 
recognition tests. These results suggested that the accuracy of feeling-of-knowledge 
judgments are dependent on how cues are presented.
Others have demonstrated that FOK judgments increase with self-generated 
feedback (Glenberg, Sanocki, Epstein & Morris, 1987). Glenberg. et. al. (1987) conducted 
a study in which comparisons were made on confidence judgments between domains 
subjects were familiar with and domains containing unfamiliar knowledge. Participants 
were more confident with familiar information than with unfamiliar information. In a 
familiar domain, comparisons were made between inference tests and verbatim tests.
While subjects in the inference group had higher familiarity than those who took the 
verbatim test confidence judgments during the testing did not differ. Subjects were also 
tested when feedback was given in the form of a pre-test. Afler the pre-test, subjects made
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confidence judgments with respect to how they would perform on the upcoming test. 
Subjects who took the pre test had more accurate confidence judgments than those who 
did not take a pre test.
Koriat and colleagues tested subjects on general knowledge asking for confidence 
judgments along with their test answers (Koriat, Lichenstein & Fischof. 1980). In the first 
condition, subjects only chose one answer from four choices. In the second condition, 
subjects had to write down reasons as to why the choice selected was the correct 
alternative, as well as any reasons why the choice was incorrect. More accurate judgments 
occurred in the justification condition. The results suggested that confidence judgments 
could be more accurate when individuals compare contrary and favorable information. The 
authors suggested contrary evidence is often not evaluated when confidence judgments are 
made.
In a later study, rewards were given when correct answers were selected in a 
general knowledge test (Koriat & Goldsmith. 1998). Participants were tested in both free 
recall and recognition tasks. Subjects performed better when rewards were given. In fact, 
subjects in the free recall task who were rewarded performed better than those who were 
rewarded in the recognition task.
Feeling-of-knowing judgments did not. however, reflect performance in problem­
solving tasks (Metcalfe, 1986). First, subjects were given a free recall general knowledge 
test and a feeling-of-knowledge judgment was made. Subjects then completed an eight- 
option recognition test. In a second task, subjects were given insight problems to solve. 
Subjects made confidence judgments and were then retested on the same problems. When 
the two tasks were compared, the general knowledge FOK judgments were more accurate
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than the problem-solving judgments. The FOK judgments associated with the problem­
solving task were very poor. An additional analysis indicated that subjects with high 
confidence judgments tended to have better performance scores.
Two theories have been developed in an attempt to explain what feeling-of- 
knowing judgments represent. Target availability theory states that the judgment 
represents an incomplete retrieval o f information in storage (Nelson, 1984; Nelson & 
Narens. 1990; Nelson. 1996). It is an established theory with many studies presented in its 
defense. The newer theory, cue availability, suggests that a feeling-of-knowing judgment 
does not represent retrieval from storage; rather it is a judgment of familiarity of the 
information for the individual. Many recent studies provide support for the cue familiarity 
theory. A more in-depth examination of each possibility follows.
Target Availability
The first theory of metacognitive control explaining feeling-of-knowing judgments 
was target availability (Nelson & Narens, 1990; Narens. Jameson. & Lee. 1994; Nelson. 
1984; Nelson, 1996; Plude, Nelson, & Scholnick. 1998). Since a feeling-of-knowing 
judgment occurs when an individual knows the answer but cannot produce it; retrieval 
from memory must be based on how accessible that information is. When the target is 
accessible, it is available for recall and the answer is produced. When it cannot be 
recalled, recognizing the correct answer among a list of choices provides evidence that the 
information had been learned and a highly confident judgment was correct.
Nelson and his colleagues suggested that a feeling-of-knowing judgment reflects 
partial access to a specified target (Leonesio & Nelson, 1990; Mazzoni & Nelson, 1998; 
Narens, Jameson & Lee, 1994; Nelson & Narens, 1994; Nelson. 1996). The information is
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recognized as being in storage, but it cannot be retrieved without cues. When a confidence 
judgment is made, it is a determination by the individual of the contents of their memory. 
The higher the ranking of the judgment, the more confident the individual is that they 
know the information without retrieving that information.
One of the first studies examined feeling-of-knowing-judgments on information in 
long-term memory (Nelson, Gerler, Narens, 1984). Subjects were given questions 
regarding general knowledge in a free recall task. FOK judgments were made on questions 
not answered correctly. Then a four-choice recognition task was given. After the initial 
recall task, answers to the questions were presented briefly via a tachistoscope to one 
group of subjects. A second group did not view the answers. Subjects had more accurate 
FOK judgments when answers were shown through the tachistoscope compared to those 
who had the recognition test only. In the next phase, one group of subjects was given a 
five second glimpse of each correct answer. Another group had the answer shown in a 
perceptual identification task, where the answer was flashed on a screen by increasing 
durations until the subject identified that answer. After a distracter activity all subjects 
were given another recall task. Subjects had greater feeling-of-knowing judgments in the 
relearning condition—those who were shown the answers for five seconds. Greater 
response latencies were identified in the incorrect responses. This suggested that the 
amount of time needed for recall was determined by what an individual felt they knew.
The authors theorized that there is an internal monitor that is used which compares the 
question to what is in memory.
In a later study, when the answer to a general knowledge question could not be 
recalled, the subjects were given one of four tests regarding their feeling-of-knowing
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recognition test, 3) a relearning opportimity where the answers were presented briefly, or 
4) perceptual identification task (Nelson, Leonesio, Landwehr & Narens, 1986). Subjects 
in the first three groups performed equally well and better than subjects in the perceptual 
identification task. Nelson et al (1986) suggested that partial inaccuracies from FOK 
judgments are not from unreliable testing, but they are a function of the accessibility of the 
memory target.
Feeling-of-knowledge judgments were compared between word pairs that were 
related to word pairs that were unrelated (Carroll, Nelson & Kirwan. 1997). Subjects were 
given 40 word pairs to learn. Twenty of the word pairs were shown twice; these word pairs 
were weakly related; for example, student-paper. The twenty unrelated word pairs (such 
as. engine-disease) were shown eight times. One group was tested on all word pairs after a 
two-week delay and the other group was tested after six weeks. FOK judgments were 
highest for word pairs in the unrelated pairings condition. The unrelated group had more 
accurate judgments. There were no differences between confidence judgments and the 
amount of delay in testing. However, the two-week delay group did have higher 
performance scores than the six-week delay group. The authors suggested FOK judgments 
are influenced by the degree to which something had been learned. Apparently participants 
did not take into consideration the effect of length of delay between the learning phase and 
the testing phase when making confidence judgments.
This theoretical framework explains feeling-of-knowing judgments in terms of an 
interaction between cognitive and metacognitive activity (Nelson & Narens, 1990; Nelson. 
1992; Nelson. 1996; Plude. Nelson. & Scholnick, 1998). Cognitive activity is considered
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to occur at the object level. The object level is the basic level where all reasoning, 
attending, encoding, and retrieval processes occur.
As opposed to the object level, the meta-level is responsible for metacognition, 
including planning and evaluating. The meta-level contains a model in which comparisons 
can be made with the current task. Information moves in a circular fashion between the 
object level and the meta-level and then back to the object level. Monitoring is the flow of 
information from the object level to the meta-level. Monitoring consists o f comparing 
what is occurring at the object level against the model within the meta-level. Feeling-of- 
knowing judgments are a part of monitoring. In contrast, control is the flow of information 
from the meta-level to the object level. Control includes adjustments in strategy or 
resource assignment at the object level when the information does not match the meta­
level model.
Target availability identifies three stages of metacognitive monitoring during 
learning. In the first, or acquisition, stage the ease of the task and what portion has been 
learned is monitored. The retention stage (stage two) focuses on the type of processing 
and amount o f study time available. The last stage, retrieval, considers which strategy 
should be used to retrieve the information. It is at stage three, or at retrieval, that measures 
of confidence in knowing the information may be made. Feeling-of-knowing judgments 
can occur during acquisition and retrieval.
Recently, target availability theory has been challenged. Opponents claim that 
feeling-of-knowing judgments indicate familiarity with the information, not the ability to 
retrieve information. Instead, these researchers believe that the cue-familiarity theory 
provides a better account of feeling-of-knowing judgments.
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Cue Familiarity
Cue-familiarity states that a feeling-of-knowing judgment is a heuristic identifying 
whether information is novel or not and the judgment is made without explicitly 
attempting to access information in long-term memory (e.g. Kamas & Reder, 1995; 
Metcalfe, 1993; Miner & Reder, 1994; Reder & Ritter, 1992; Schwartz & Metcalfe, 1992). 
FOK judgments are thought to represent a confidence ranking of how familiar the 
individual is with information related to the question.
As indicated previously, Glenberg and colleagues (Glenberg, Sanocki. Epstein. & 
Morris. 1987) found poor FOK judgments on reading comprehension tests when 
judgments focused on domain familiarity. This was interpreted to mean that individuals 
used familiarity with the cues in the text rather than specific text information. The authors 
demonstrated that judgments could be improved with feedback in the form of a pretest that 
is closely related to the final test.
Koriat (1993) had subjects memorize four-letter nonsense strings and recall as 
many letters as possible. Subjects then made FOK judgments and took a recognition test 
on the letter strings. Koriat found higher feeling-of-knowing judgments when more letters 
of the string were reported. Next, the same task was performed with various lengths of 
time between the recall and recognition tasks, in which subjects where engaged in a 
distracter activity. Retrieval was more accurate with the shorter interval. In addition, more 
information was recalled with the shorter interval. FOK judgments were related to the 
accessibility of the information. Accessibility is based on the amount of information 
encoded and the duration between encoding and retrieval. FOK accuracy is dependent on 
the accessibility of that information. Koriat (1993, 1994; Metacalfe, 1998) suggested that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
24
subjects may have a high level of confidence when answering a question and yet their 
response may be completely inaccurate.
In a later study, Koriat (1995) tested subjects using a general knowledge test. The 
subjects had to complete a recall test, then a recognition version. When subjects had high 
feeling-of-knowing judgments, they tended to be more accurate in the recognition task. 
When examining errors, high feeling-of-knowing judgments were associated with errors of 
commission more than errors of omission. In relation to the recall task, higher FOK 
judgments were associated with the wrong answer. These results were thought to suggest 
that feeling-of-knowing judgments do not reflect target retrieval, only target accessibility.
Metcalfe. Schwartz, and Jouquim (1993) suggested that feeling-of-knowing 
judgments do not reflect memorability; rather, feeling-of-knowing judgments were 
indicative of the number of presentations of a cue. For example, in one study subjects had 
to recall four lists of twelve word pairs in a paired-associate task. They were placed in one 
of four conditions: 1 ) learn the same list twice (A-B; A-B), 2) the second list had the same 
words in different pairings from the first list (A-B’; A-B), 3) the second list had new 
words paired with words from the first list (A-D; A-B), and 4) neither list had any similar 
words or word pairings (C-D; A-B). The second and third lists were more likely to result 
in interference. In other words, the mixture of old and new words in word pairings would 
make retention more difficult. (For a thorough review of interference literature see 
Dempster, 1995 or Dempster and Corkill, 1999). If the participant could not recall the 
word paired with its cue, an FOK judgment was made followed by an eight-choice 
recognition test. Subjects in the A-B; A-B condition had the highest recall, followed by 
AB’; AB, A-D; A-B, and C-D; A-B. Subjects in this last condition were statistically less
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confident than subjects in the other three groups. FOK judgments reflected the number of 
presentations of the word pairs. The results were the same in the recognition test phase, 
regardless of the difficulty due to interference from the distracters or cued recall instead of 
a recognition test.
Reder and Ritter (1992) used feeling-of-knowing judgments as an initial 
confidence judgment. When individuals were presented with a computational problem, 
they had to rate how confident they were that they would recognize the correct answer 
before solving the problem. The results suggested that feeling-of-knowing judgments were 
best interpreted as an initial judgment of recognition, not a trace into memory storage. In 
other words, feeling-of-knowing judgments served as a gauge of how familiar the 
individual was with the question.
Reder (1987; 1996) theorized that choosing a specific strategy was based on the 
demands of the task. In one such study (Reder, 1987), subjects were given stories to read. 
They then had to rate statements regarding the plausibility of that story. Response latencies 
to each plausibility statement were measured. When the questions were more similar to the 
sentences in the story, a direct retrieval strategy was used. When more time or reasoning 
was required, then a plausibility strategy was used. Subjects did change strategy when the 
different types of questions were interspersed within the same story. The strategy selection 
appeared to be automatic and without conscious control. Reder suggested that familiarity 
leads to direct retrieval from memory and shorter response latencies. In a related finding, 
Reder and Ritter (1992) determined that the use of heuristics, such as feeling-of-knowing 
judgments, could be used to provide a quick gauge of subject familiarity with a task.
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Several researchers have concluded that individuals tend to be overconfident in 
their FOK judgments (e.g. Glenberg, Sanocki, Epstein, & Morris, 1987; Koriat 
Lichenstein & Fischof. 1993; Metcalfe, 1998; Pressley & Ghatala, 1990). When asked for 
confidence ratings in the feeling-of-knowing paradigm, subject ratings were consistently 
higher than the ability to recall the teamed data. Metcalfe (1993, 1998) suggests such 
overconfidence is the result of a heuristic predicting future performance based on past 
experience, tailored to the current question. In other words, subjects believe their answer is 
good enough and correct (Metcalfe, 1986b). Over-optimism also contributes to over­
confidence. Being so optimistic, however, may lead to missing relevant aspects o f the task, 
such as looking for contradictory information in a passage (Epstein, Glenberg. & Bradley, 
1984). In addition, Corkill and Koshida (1993) found those who assess themselves as high 
metacognitive monitors were more accurate at assessing their abilities, but still over­
confident.
In summary, considerable research has been conducted in the field of 
metacognition on feeling-of-knowing judgments and monitoring. Feeling of knowing 
judgments are one measure of monitoring and metacognitive control. There remains an 
active debate between theoreticians of the make-up of FOK judgments. In a parallel area 
of study, monitoring ability individual differences have been identified. Monitoring has 
been associated with the acquisition of domain specific information. The present study 
proposed to tie monitoring research more closely with FOK judgments. There should be 
similar individual differences in FOK judgments that have been identified in the 
metacognitive monitoring research.
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The Present Study
Despite all of the research on metacognitive monitoring and feeling-of-knowing 
judgments, little attention has been given to whether feeling-of-knowing judgments are a 
part of the monitoring continuum between those with high metacognitive ability and low 
metacognitive ability. It should be expected that there are individual differences in FOK 
judgments as a reflection of monitoring ability. In the present study these individual 
differences were measured by two different tasks; a paired-associate task to represent 
judgments related to new learning and a test of general knowledge representing judgments 
from prior learning. To assess monitoring ability, the Metacognitive Awareness Inventory 
was used.
Metacognitive Awareness Inventory
The Metacognitive Awareness Inventory (MAI) was developed to measure both 
metacognitive knowledge and control (Schraw & Dennison, 1994). It is a 52-item 
questionnaire. Internal consistency scores range from 0.88 and 0.93 (Schraw & Dennison,
1994). Each question was written to represent one of six sub-components of 
metacognition, (declarative knowledge, procedural knowledge, conditional knowledge, 
planning, monitoring, and evaluation). However, factor analysis did not recognize these 
six components. Two factors were identified in confirmatory factor analysis according to 
the theoretical basis of metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive control. Because the 
factors were identified through confirmatory factory analysis instead of a data driven 
investigation, this inventory may lack the power o f exploratory factor analysis. Indeed, six 
of the test items had cross-loadings and two items had no loading whatsoever.
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To determine the validity of the MAI, the inventory items were compared to 
confidence ratings and performance on reading comprehension tests (Schraw & Dennison, 
1994). Subjects were placed in one of three groups according to confidence ratings. The 
high and middle confidence groups had significantly higher scores on Factor 
I—metacognitive knowledge-than the low confidence group. There was no difference 
between groups on Factor 2—metacognitive control—or total MAI score. When subjects 
were divided into three groups by performance and compared to the MAI, both 
factors-metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive controi-were significantly related. 
High performance scores corresponded to high scores on both metacognitive knowledge 
and control on the MAI. Subjects with low performance scores also had low scores in 
metacognitive awareness and control. Factor 2, or metacognitive control, was expected to 
be predictive of FOK judgments (Schraw. personal communication February, 2002).
Others have used the Metacognitive Awareness Inventory in research related to the 
use of metacognition in domain specific instruction. For example, resident physicians in 
anesthesiology were compared on several inventories in metacognitive ability, domain 
knowledge, gender, and motivation (Plants. 2000). There were significant correlations 
between metacognition, domain knowledge, and motivation. Furthermore, metacognition 
was influential with respect to medical intern’s performance after prior knowledge was 
partialed out in statistical analysis. Interns with better metacognitive skills, as identified by 
the MAI, were more likely to be successful.
Other studies have investigated using hypertext links in teaching metacognitive 
skills. Stimson (1999) found the Metacognitive Awareness Inventory predicted learning 
using hypertext. Hypertext is a highlighted phrase in an electronic document that leads to
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more in-depth or related material. In this case, when the hypertext was accessed, questions 
regarding metacognitive monitoring were presented. Subjects were placed in a group that 
either read hypertext material or a group that read a linear text. Subjects with the hypertext 
passages had better performance scores. In addition, the MAI had high predictive value for 
subjects in the hypertext, but not the linear text group. Presumably individuals with high 
MAI scores were better at self-regulation during learning. These subjects were more likely 
to realize when they would need to access the hyperlinked text, and were more inclined to 
use such hyperlinked text. The additional information gained from the hyperlink text 
would then result in improved performance on a recall test. Individuals with less 
awareness, as indicated by the MAI, would be less likely to utilize the hypertext links, 
because they would not realize they did not understand the material. Subjects who read 
linear text appeared to function as a control group for this study. In other words. MAI 
scores are not related to performance scores because even when a subject realizes they 
need additional information in order to understand the text no additional information was 
available.
When metacognitive cues were embedded in web pages that taught metacognitive 
skills, cognitive regulation cues were successfully conveyed whereas cognitive knowledge 
cues were not (Moore, 2000). In Moore’s study, subjects completed the MAI and a 
computer-based instructional module. Each participant was placed in one of three groups:
1 ) knowledge of cognition cues, 2) regulation of cognition cues, and 3) no cues. In the 
knowledge of cognition group, cues related to metacognitive knowledge were embedded 
in the web page. In the regulation of cognition group, cues related to metacognitive control 
were embedded in the instructional web pages. The regulation of cognition group had
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better performance scores than the other groups. There were no significant differences 
between groups on the MAI.
This study demonstrated the importance of metacognitive control cues in 
instruction. Moore did not find any difference between metacognitive knowledge and 
metacognitive control groups. This should not be surprising since the MAI is composed of 
items that reflect both metacognitive knowledge and control.
Metacognitive awareness had little effect with veterinarian students who were 
taught using case studies (Law, 1999). In this study, veterinarian students were given 
several case studies in veterinarian pharmocokinetics. Students were placed into one of 
two conditions, subjects either had use of a provided pharmocokinetic model or they had 
to assemble a model of their own. Metacognitive awareness was measured with the MAI. 
The group that assembled their own models performed better on the case study test than 
subjects with a provided model, but the MAI had no predictive value for either group.
Need for Cognition
The Need for Cognition scale was developed by Cacioppo and Petty (1982). Need 
for cognition is a stable trait reflecting the willingness or motivation of an individual to 
become involved in effortful cognitive activity (Tidwell, Sadowski, & Pate. 2000). 
Individuals high in need for cognition tend to engt^e in and enjoy thinking (Cacioppo & 
Petty, 1982). They also tend to organize, elaborate, and evaluate information they have 
been exposed to. Individuals who measure high on this scale tend to enjoy complex tasks. 
Individuals high in need for cognition also report less fhistration and mental discomfort 
during cognitive tasks. Need for cognition has been shown to be unrelated to gender, sex
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role attitudes, and sociability (Cacioppo & Petty. 1982; Osberg. 1987). A factor analysis 
resulted in one factor, need for cognition. Split-half reliability was reported at 0.87.
The Need for Cognition scale is positively correlated with verbal intelligence 
(Cacioppo, Petty, Kao, & Rodriguez, 1986), ACT scores (Cacioppo and Petty, 1982), 
domain knowledge (Tidwell, Sadowski, & Pate, 2000), and verbal ability (Kardash &
Noel, 2000). Positive relationships have been found between the Need for Cognition scale 
and measures of self-esteem, personal attitudes, and attention (Osberg, 1987). Negative 
associations have been found between the Need for Cognition scale and self-consciousness 
and social anxiety.
Two other forms of the Need for Cognition scale have been developed. The short 
form developed by Cacioppo, Petty, and Kao (1984) retained 18 of the original 45 items. 
The reliability between the original and short form was 0.95. Cronbach alpha on the short 
form ranged between 0.86 and 0.95 (Cacioppo, Petty & Kao, 1984; Sadowski, 1992; 
Sadowski & Gulgoz, 1992). Test-retest reliability over a seven-week span was 0.88. The 
short form also has been positively correlated with ACT scores and grade point average 
(Tolentino, Curry & Leak, 1990). Preference for reading material, magazines, fiction and 
nonfiction books, have been positively correlated with need for cognition using the short 
form.
Ahlering and Parker ( 1989) have suggested that individuals with a high need for 
cognition process information differently than those with a low need for cognition. In a 
study, subjects were compared on their Need for Cognition scale scores and response 
latencies in ranking individuals according to a list of adjectives read to the subject. 
Response latencies were not significant between subjects with high NFC scores and those
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with low NFC scores. When looking for a primacy effect, subjects with high NFC scores 
did have lower mean primacy scores than those with low NFC scores. In other words, 
subjects with high need for cognition were less susceptible to primacy effects. Incredibly 
the authors interpreted this to mean that subjects with high need for cognition process 
information differently than those with low need for cognition.
Miner (1992) found that individuals with a high need for cognition outperformed 
those with a low need for cognition in conceptually driven encoding and retrieval tasks. 
Subjects with low need for cognition did better at data-driven encoding and retrieval tasks. 
Kardash and Noel (2000) gave subjects an essay, followed by recall and recognition tasks. 
Subjects with higher need for cognition scores recalled more than those with low need for 
cognition scores. These studies suggest that those with low need for cognition may make 
use of information and cognitive resources differently than those with a high need for 
cognition. Unfortunately, the methods and variables used in these studies are insufficient 
for identifying the extent to which information may be processed differently or to identify 
individual differences in cognitive resources used to complete these tasks. Swanson (1990; 
Swanson & Trahan, 1996) has shown that individuals with high metacognitive ability have 
better performance scores than those with low metacognitive ability. The similarities 
between metacognitive ability and need for cognition may indicate a relationship between 
the two constructs.
Tanaka, Ranter, and Winbome ( 1988) developed a modified Need for Cognition 
scale using 34 of the original items. Through exploratory factor analysis three subscales 
were identified: cognitive persistence, cognitive confidence, and cognitive complexity. 
Cognitive persistence reflects how focused one believes oneself to be in a cognitive task.
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Cognitive confidence represents how successful a person expects to be in correctly 
completing a task. Cognitive complexity reflects the degree to which an individual enjoys 
the intricacies of a task. Coefficient alpha scores for internal consistency on the total 
modified form range between 0.77 and 0.89 (Waters & Zakrajsek, 1990). Subscale 
reliability scores, also measured by coefficient alpha, were; cognitive persistence between
0.68 and 0.81; cognitive confidence between 0.59 and 0.68; and cognitive complexity 
between 0.57 and 0.71. Small but significant positive correlations were found between the 
modified Need for Cognition form and ACT scores as well as grade point average.
It has been demonstrated that metacognition and intelligence are not highly related 
(Swanson, 1990; Swanson, Chrisitie, & Rubadeau, 1993; Swanson & Trahan, 1996) while 
need for cognition and intelligence is (Cacioppo and Petty, 1982; Cacioppo, Petty, Kao, & 
Rodriguez, 1986; Kardash & Noel, 2000; Tidwell, Sadowski, & Pate, 2000). Still, certain 
subscales in the Need for Cognition scale, specifically cognitive persistence and cognitive 
confidence, may be related to metacognitive monitoring processes. Metacognitive 
knowledge of person and strategy variables may have an effect on how confident and 
persistent an individual is at a cognitive task. If a person has high awareness of their 
cognitive abilities they should be highly confident and persistent in cognitive tasks. This 
has yet to be investigated.
One problem with measuring metacognitive monitoring is that the questions 
typically asked on monitoring scales may reinforce strategies or give subjects new ideas on 
how to proceed in a cognitive task. One solution to this problem would be to provide 
enough questions that the purpose of the study is sufficiently camouflaged. The Need for 
Cognition scale was used for two reasons: 1 ) to investigate the relationship between Need
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for Cognition and metacognitive awareness, and 2) to mask the nature of the items of the 
Metacognitive Awareness Inventory.
The goal of this study is to assess the individual differences between subjects with 
high metacognitive monitoring ability and those with low metacognitive monitoring ability 
in retrieval from memory and in encoding data using feeling-of-knowing judgments. The 
hypotheses in this study were:
1. Individuals with high metacognitive control scores from the Metacognitive 
Awareness Inventory would be more accurate in confidence ratings while 
those with low metacognitive control scores wouldl have greater 
inaccuracies in confidence ratings in a recall/recognition task.
2. Individuals with high metacognitive monitoring scores would have 
significantly greater accuracy in confidence at recall in a paired-associates 
task than those with low monitoring scores.
3. There would be positive relationships between the Need of Cognition scale 
and the Metacognitive Awareness Inventory. The monitoring scale in the 
Metacognitive Awareness Inventory would be positively related to the NFC 
subscales cognitive persistence and cognitive confidence.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 2 
METHOD
Subjects
Participants consisted of 75 undergraduate students from the University of 
Nevada. Las Vegas recruited from the Educational Psychology Department Subject 
Pool during the Spring 2002 semester. There were 11 males and 64 females. The 
average age was 25.4 years. Each volunteer received research credit in partial 
fulfillment of a course requirement. It was assumed this sample would be relatively 
unbiased and random. Informed written consent was obtained prior to participation 
from each individual, according to University of Nevada. Las Vegas protocols.
All participants were tested together in a typical classroom in groups of 10 to 
15. Participants were divided into three groups according to ability as measured by the 
second factor, metacognitive control, of the Metacognitive Awareness Inventory. The 
25 participants with the lowest Metacognitive Awareness Inventory scores were 
assigned to the low monitoring group. The 24 individuals with the highest scores on 
the Metacognitive Awareness Inventory were assigned to the high monitoring group. 
The remaining 26 constituted the middle group.
Materials
Metacognitive Awareness Inventory.
35
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The second inventory was the Metacognitive Awareness Inventory. This 
consisted of a 52-item self-report inventory developed by Schraw and Dennison 
(1994). The Metacognitive Awareness Inventory had six categories separated into two 
factors, metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive regulation. Coefficient alpha 
scores for internal consistency range between 0.88 to 0.93. The second factor, 
metacognitive regulation was used to discriminate individuals according to monitoring 
ability.
Need for Cognition scale.
This study used the modified Need for Cognition scale developed by Tanaka, 
Panter, and Winterbome (1988). The modified form has only 34 of the original 45 
items. The main purpose of the Need for Cognition Scale was to mask the 
metacognitive monitoring measurement. It was hoped this would prevent participants 
from acquiring and using information from the Metacognitive Awareness Inventory .
The modified form has three subscales identified through factor analysis; cognitive 
persistence, cognitive confidence, and cognitive complexity. The Cronbach alpha for 
the modified Need for Cognition scale ranged between 0.77 and 0.89. The alphas for 
the subscales ranged for cognitive persistence between 0 . 6 8  and 0.81. for cognitive 
confidence between 0.59 and 0.68. and for cognitive complexity between 0.57 and 
0.71.
Recall task.
The recall task consisted of 27 items selected from Nelson and Narens (1980)
300 general knowledge questions. There were 25 test items plus 2 practice items.
These questions covered subjects such as American and World History, Science.
Sports. Literature, and Entertairunent (sample question; What is the highest mountain
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in South America? answer: Aconcagua). Twenty-five items were selected at random 
where the probability of recall was 0.496 or less, according to the original normative 
data. The recall probability mean of all twenty-five items was 0.139. This criterion 
was chosen to allow moderate recognition answers without having high recall. Five 
questions were excluded from consideration because males had a significantly higher 
probability of recall than females. A pilot study maintained a gender difference on 
these items. Four other questions were excluded because of changes in the last twenty 
years from when the original data was tested (e.g.. What is the capital of 
Czechoslovakia? This item was excluded because Czechoslovakia no longer exists.)
The final pool from which the 25 questions were selected was 191 items.
Answers were written on a separate sheet. The answer sheet consisted of a 
number corresponding to each test item, a line for the answer, and confidence ratings 
in intervals of twenty-0,20.40.60. 80 and 100. The confidence intervals were based 
on Reder and Ritter (1992; see also Koriat. 1995; Nelson. 1996; Carroll. Nelson &
Kirwan, 1997). The questions and answer sheets appear in Appendix I.
Recognition task.
The recognition task used the same items and procedure in the recall task; 
however, the items were presented with five answer choices: four distracters and the 
correct response. The test items were randomly re-ordered. The answer sheet reflected 
the difference in the task. There were five letters, A through E, representing each 
answer choice. The participant circled the corresponding letter. Corresponding 
confidence intervals of twenty appeared before each test item. The multiple-choice 
questions with the distracters and the answer sheet appear in Appendix I.
Paired-Associate Task.
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The paired-associate task consisted of 20 noun-noun pairs presented orally on a 
previously recorded audiocassette to insure consistency in presentation. At encoding, 
subjects heard the noun-noun pairs at 3-second intervals. At recall, one noun was read 
and the participant wrote the corresponding noun. Participants had 5 seconds to recall 
the corresponding noun on the recall task. At the first trial, each word pair was 
presented. Subjects were then tested. In the second trial, the same word pairs were 
presented but in a different order. This ordering was established by random selection 
of the pairings. In the third trial, pairings included seven of the original pairs, seven of 
the words paired with a new word, and six novel word pairings. Each trial was 
recorded on a separate answer sheet. These sheets included confidence ratings prior to 
each response. Each list and the answer sheet may be found in Appendix I.
Procedure
The author collected all data, after approval of the thesis committee and the 
University of Nevada. Las Vegas Institutional Review Board for the ethical treatment 
of human subjects.
All participants first completed the Need for Cognition scale and the 
Metacognitive Awareness Inventory. This took approximately 20 minutes.
The Metacognitive Awareness Inventory was used to divide subjects into groups 
according to monitoring ability. The 24 students with the highest Metacognitive Awareness 
Inventory scores were placed in the high monitor group. The 25 students with lowest 
Metacognitive Awareness Inventory scores were placed in the low monitor group. The 
middle monitoring group was comprised of the remaining 26 subjects.
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The second half of the session included the recall and recognition tasks and the 
paired- associate task. The recall task consisted of 25 trivia question taken from the Nelson 
and Narens (1980) normative data. The instructions were read aloud by the experimenter 
and contained the following:
The purpose of this experiment is to investigate your knowledge about 
general information. After you read each question you should circle how 
confident your are that you know the correct answer. Then. PRINT your 
best guess in the space provided on the answer sheet. If you are positive 
you do not know the answer then circle the confidence level and write 
NEXT on the line provided. The answer will always consist of exactly one 
word and will never be longer than one word. The questions differ in how 
easy or hard they may be to answer.
Now let’s try a couple of practice questions. Move your answer 
sheet to one side. The first question is ’’What is the name of the horse-like 
animal with black and white stripes?” Circle how confident you are that 
that is the answer and write your answer in the space provided. Now look at 
the second question. It asks. 'What is the last name of the author who wrote 
‘The Old Man and the Sea’?” Again circle how confident you are that that 
is the answer and write your answer in the space provided. Now. if you 
have any questions about the procedure raise your hand. The experimenter 
cannot answer any questions once you have begun. When you are ready 
turn to the next page and begin.
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Individuals then completed the recall task by reading the question, circling their 
confidence rating, and then writing down their answers. Each individual was given 
unlimited time to complete this task.
I he next portion consisted of the recognition task. I he same twenty-five questions 
were presented in a new randomized order. However, five answer choices were given 
with the question. The same instructions were given with the modification being that the 
participant would circle the letter on the answer sheet that corresponds with the correct 
answer. Again the corresponding confidence level was requested prior to answering the 
question. The first two questions were examples and used as demonstration. They were not 
included in the analysis. Subjects were given unlimited time to finish.
The final component of the testing session was the paired-associates task. Subjects 
heard twenty noun-noun pairs from a pre-recorded audiocassette. At recall, one noun, the 
cue, was presented and each participant wrote the corresponding noun on the answer sheet. 
Individuals circled how confident they were at retrieving the correct noun. This process 
was repeated until all twenty cue-nouns had been heard and recorded with each 
corresponding confidence rating. The procedure was repeated for the second trial. Then a 
third trial list was presented in the same manner. Each participant wrote down the 
confidence rating and new pairing as before. It was expected the AB-ABr task would 
measure differences in monitoring ability and interference.
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CHAPTER 3 
RESULTS
The Metacognitive Awareness Inventory was scored in the manner described by 
Schraw and Dennison (1994). The Cronbach alpha on the MAI was 0.92. Scores on Factor 
2 (metacognitive regulation) of the Metacognitive Awareness Inventory were tallied and 
each participant was ranked from highest to lowest, according to their scores on the 
inventory. The alpha for Factor 2 was 0.89. Factor 2 items are found in Appendix 1. 
Groups were divided into thirds by percentile rank at 33% and 67%. There were 24 people 
in the high monitoring group, 26 in the moderate monitoring group, and 25 in the low 
monitoring group. The means and standard deviations of MAI Factor 2 scores for each 
group are presented in Table 1. In order to establish that the three monitoring level groups 
were different in terms of self-reported monitoring ability, a one-way analysis-of-variance 
was conducted with group (high, middle, low) as the independent variable and MAI Factor 
2 as the dependent variable. The groups were significantly different, F,,,?:! = 226.10, MSe 
= 40.65, p < 0.05. A post hoc Tukey HSD indicated that all groups were significantly 
different from each other.
Traditionally the Goodman-Kruskal rank correlation gamma statistic has been used 
in work with feeling-o(-knowing judgment ratings (Nelson, 1984). Some (Kelemen, Frost 
& Weaver, 2000) consider the gamma (G) the best measure of relative metacognitive 
accuracy. There were several issues, however, that precluded use of the Goodman-
41
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Kxuskal gamma in this study. Specifically, there were a number of confidence judgment 
ties between incorrect and correct responses. This resulted in a large number of gammas 
that were either + 1  or - 1 , leading to ceiling and floor effects. This did not provide enough 
variance for analysis. 1 herefore, gamma was not the most appropriate approach under 
these circumstances (Goodman and Kruskal. 1954). Several other approaches for 
examining confidence exist including Briar’s index (Yates, 1990; Keren. 1991). a 
discrimination index (Schraw & Dennison, 1994), the bias index (Yates, 1990). and 
Confidence Accuracy Quotient (e.g. Keren, 1991). Two approaches were deemed 
appropriate for this study; 1) a bias measure (Yates, 1990; see also Schraw & Netfield,
1998) because it is considered a measure of absolute metacognitive accuracy (Kelemen, 
Frost & Weaver, 2000) and 2) the Confidence Accuracy Quotient (CAQ) because it 
reflects the degree to which a person’s confidence for a correct answer exceeds their 
confidence for an incorrect answer (Keren, 1991 ; Lundeberg, Fox, & Puncochar, 1994).
The bias score is the difference between the mean level of confidence and the mean 
performance score divided by 100. All scores range between +1 and -1. This measures 
the degree to which a participant was overconfident or underconfident. Scores greater 
than zero represent overconfidence, while scores less than zero represent underconfidence. 
A score o f zero represents no bias. The means and standard deviations for the bias scores 
for the three monitoring groups on the feeling-of-knowing task are shown in Table 2.
Table 3 displays the means and standard deviations for the three groups across the paired- 
associates task.
A Confidence Accuracy Quotient (CAQ) reflects the degree to which the 
participant’s confidence for a correct answer exceeds confidence for an incorrect answer.
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A negative CAQ value represents higher confidence when wrong than when right. In other 
words, a subject is more confident about incorrect answers than correct answers. A 
positive CAQ value represents higher confidence when correct than when wrong; a subject 
is more confident about correct answers than incorrect answers. A CAQ of zero reflects an 
inability on the subject’s part to distinguish between instances when they are right versus 
when they are wrong. The CAQ means and standard deviations for the feeling-of-knowing 
task and the paired-associates task are shown in Tables 4 and 5. respectively.
The first hypothesis was that subjects in the high monitoring group would be more 
accurate in confidence ratings in the feeling-of-knowing task. This means that for the high 
monitoring group bias scores should be closer to zero and CAQ scores should be positive. 
In the feeling-of-knowing paradigm recall scores are not typically included in statistical 
analysis, rather they are used to eliminate items from the recognition task on a subject-by- 
subject basis. If a subject can correctly retrieve an answer on a recall item, that item is 
eliminated from the recognition task because the confidence rating for that item should be 
100 percent. Thus, there were typically less than 25 items scored on confidence ratings in 
the recognition task for each subject. In the feeling-of knowing task (recognition task) 
there was no significant difference between groups on either bias or CAQ scores as 
indicated by one-way ANOVA, F,, = 0.80, MSe = 0.03, n.s.; F,, = 0.05, MSe = 0.34,
n.s. respectively.
Each monitoring group was examined to see if either bias or CAQ were 
significantly different from zero. With respect to bias scores, the high and middle 
monitoring groups were significantly distant from zero, while the low monitoring group 
was not (high t = 2.41, p < 0.05; middle t = 2.90, p < 0.05; low t = 1.59, n.s.). This
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suggests that the high and middle monitoring group were overconfident, while the low 
monitoring group was neither over nor under confident. The Calibration Accuracy 
Quotient was significant for all three groups (high t = 3.92, p < 0.05; middle t = 5.00. p < 
0.05, low t = 3.84, p < 0.05). This suggests that they realized when they were guessing and 
when they knew the answer
The second hypothesis was that the high monitoring group would have greater 
accuracy in confidence judgments in the paired-associates task than those who rated 
themselves as poor monitors. A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted for scores on 
the paired-associates task. No statistical differences were found between monitoring 
groups for either bias scores, = 0.31 MSe = 0.01, n.s. or CAQ scores, F,2 ,7 2 , = 0.77 
MSe = 1.05, n.s. Although the analysis of CAQ scores was not significant, it is worth 
noting that CAQ scores for subjects in the high monitoring group increased from test to 
test while CAQ scores for the subjects in the low monitoring group were relatively 
constant across the first two trials followed by a substantial decrease on the final test.
In analyzing how each group did separately, a one-way repeated measures ANOVA 
was conducted. The high monitoring group was significantly distant from zero across all 
three trials. The bias F was 8.12,, ,4 ,, p < 0.05. The CAQ F score was 241.62,, 3 4 ,, p <
0.05. The middle monitoring group was also significant across all trials, bias F,, ,5 , = 4.37, 
p < 0.05, CAQ F,| 2 5) = 153.47, p < 0.05. The low monitors were not statistically 
significant on the bias scores (F,, = 3.88, n.s.), but they were significant with respect to
the CAQ (F„ 2 3) = 102.56, p < 0.05).
In the original factor analysis of the MAI conducted by Schraw and Dennison 
( 1994), there were a number of cross-loadings between factors. Schraw and Dennison 
identified factors on theoretical rather than statistical groimds. This means that scores on
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Factor 1 and Factor 2 and total MAI may be highly correlated. Due to this possibility, 
correlations were calculated between total MAI, Factor 1. and Factor 2. The correlation 
between total MAI and Factor 1 was r = 0.78 (p < 0.05); Total MAI and Factor 2, r = 0.94 
(p < 0.05); and Factor 1 and Factor 2, r = 0.53 (p < 0.05). Because of these moderate to 
high correlations further analysis of bias and CAQ scores was considered appropriate.
Scores on Factor 1 (metacognitive knowledge) were tallied and each participant 
was ranked from highest to lowest according to how they scored on the inventory. The 
alpha for Factor 1 was 0.84. Factor 1 items are found in the Appendix 1. Groups were 
divided into thirds by percentile rank at 33% and 67%. There were 27 people in the high 
monitoring group, 2 2  in the moderate monitoring group, and 26 in the low monitoring 
group. The means and standard deviations of MAI Factor 1 scores for each group are 
presented in Table 6 . In order to determine if the three monitoring groups were different 
in terms of self-reported monitoring ability, a one-way ANOVA was conducted with group 
(high, middle, and low) as the independent variable and MAI Factor 1 as the dependent 
variable. The groups were significantly different, F,, 7,, = 99.53, MSe = 20.57, p < 0.05. A 
post hoc Tukey HSD indicated that all groups were significantly different from each other.
When groups were divided using Factor 1 the results were not significant. The F 
ratio for bias scores on the feeling-of-knowing was 0.87,, 7 2, MSe = 0.03, n.s. The CAQ F 
ratio was 0.82,2,72,, MSe = 0.33, n.s. For the paired-associates task the bias score the F 
score was 1.56,2,72, MSe = 0.07, and F value was 0.01,2 7 2 , MSe = 0.01 for the CAQ score.
Groups were then divided according to the total MAI score into thirds by percentile 
rank at 33% and 67%. There were 25 people in the high monitoring group, 25 in the 
moderate monitoring group, and 25 in the low monitoring group. The means and standard 
deviations of total MAI scores for each group are presented in Table 7. In order to
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determine if the three monitoring level groups were different in terms of self-reported 
monitoring ability, a one-way analysis-of-variance was conducted with group (high, 
middle, and low) as the independent variable and MAI total score as the dependent 
variable. The groups were significantly different, F,2 7 2 ) ^ 192.69, MSe = 81.49, p < 0.05.
A post hoc Tukey HSD indicated that all groups were significantly different from each 
other. The total score bias F value for the feeling-of-knowing task was 0.37,, 7 2 , MSe =
0.03, n.s., and 0.41,2 72, MSe = 0.34, n.s., for the CAQ score. For the paired-associates task 
the bias score was F , , 7 2,0.27 MSe = 0.01, n.s., while the CAQ F was 1.07,2 7,, MSe =1.01, 
n.s. There were no differences in confidence judgments between ability groups.
The last hypothesis was that there would be a positive relationship between the 
Metacognitive Awareness Inventory and the Need for Cognition Scale. In particular, the 
MAI should be positively related to the Need for Cognition cognitive persistence and 
cognitive confidence subscales. Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated between 
the MAI and NFC including all subscales. The correlation between total MAI and total 
score on the NFC was significant, r  = 0.55 (p < 0.05). The correlation between total MAI 
and the NFC subscale cognitive persistence was r = 0.42 (p < 0.05), and between total 
MAI and the NFC subscale cognitive complexity was r  = 0.51 (p < 0.05). All correlations 
are shown in Table 8 . The Cronbach alpha for the NFC was 0.50, which is much lower 
than previously reported (Tanaka, Ranter & Winterbome, 1988). For the subscales the 
alpha for cognitive persistence was 0.34; for cognitive confidence alpha was 0.64; the 
alpha for cognitive complexity was 0.18. This hypothesis was supported by the significant 
correlations between the Metacognitive Awareness Inventory and the Need for Cognition 
subscales cognitive persistence and cognitive confidence
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 4 
DISCUSSION
First some possible interpretations for the first two hypotheses are presented. The 
relationship between the MAI and NFC is examined. The limitations of the study are then 
reviewed. Some limitations are inherent to all related research, for example, the reliance 
on self-report and social desirability. Others limitations may be due to the instruments 
used in this study. The last section examines what research could be done based on the 
results of this study and how it may fit in with previous research. This includes what 
improvements could be made to this study and a more in-depth look at the appropriateness 
of the target availability theory.
The first hypothesis was that subjects who ranked themselves high in 
metacognitive monitoring would demonstrate higher levels of accuracy in confidence 
scores on the general knowledge feeling-of-knowing task. The bias score reflects the 
degree of overconfidence. According to the bias scores on the recognition task, the middle 
monitoring group had the highest mean score, while the low monitoring group had the 
lowest mean score. This depicts the middle monitoring group as the most overconfident 
and the low monitoring group as the least overconfident. Overall, however, subjects’ 
confidence ratings were relatively close to zero, suggesting that subjects knew when they 
were selecting correct versus incorrect answers.
47
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On the recognition task, the high monitoring group had the lowest CAQ scores, 
while the middle monitoring group had the highest (see Figure 2). As a whole, subjects' 
CAQ scores indicated that they were more confident when selecting the correct answer 
than when selecting an incorrect answer. In other words, they knew when they were right, 
but were unsure when guessing.
The selected test items were ranked between moderate to difficult in ability to 
answer. If the items were easy there will be little overconfidence because each item would 
be correctly answered. If all items were difficult there may also be little overconfidence 
because the subject may recognize that they do not know that answer. These questions may 
have been more difficult than moderate. This could account for the low bias scores. The 
more difficult questions may have made it easier to distinguish what was known from 
what was guessed. This would explain the clear distinction in the CAQ scores.
The statistical difference from zero for each group on this task suggests that on the 
CAQ scores each group was able to distinguish what they knew from what they did not 
know. While the bias scores indicate the high and moderate groups were overconfident, 
the low monitoring group was neither over nor under confident. This indicates the low 
group knew they were poor monitors. These results fit well with Schraw ( 1994).
The second hypothesis was that subjects who ranked themselves high in 
metacognitive monitoring would demonstrate higher levels of accuracy in confidence 
scores on the paired-associate task. When the three groups were examined by bias and 
CAQ scores, each group had a unique response pattern, though not significantly different, 
as seen in Figures 4 and 5. Subjects in both high and low monitoring group started with 
similar bias scores. In the second trial, the high monitors bias scores increased while the 
low monitors remained low. In the final trial, the low monitoring group increased their
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judgments to match the high monitoring group. The middle group started with high 
overconfidence (the highest bias scores) and then overcorrected, having very low bias 
scores in the second trial. In the final trial, the middle group matched a moderate 
confidence score with the other two groups. Subjects were tested on the same pairings in 
the first two trials. In the third trial some of the same pairing were presented, some brand 
new pairings were presented and some of the original words were paired with different 
nouns. This last trial would have been more open to the influence of interference. A 
detailed analysis of subject performance on each type of noun-noun pair (old, new, or 
mixed) might yield more information with respect to this hypothesis. This, however, was 
beyond the scope of the present study.
With respect to the CAQ scores, all three groups performed similarly on the first 
trial. Higher CAQ scores reflect greater confidence in correct answers over incorrect 
answers. The middle group remained consistent across all trials. The high monitoring 
group became more confident of their correct answers across trials. The low monitoring 
group confidence dropped with the introduction of new material in the last trial. It appears 
that the low monitoring group judgments were more susceptible to the interference related 
to the different pairings in the third trial. A detailed analysis of the type of pairing in the 
third trial may shed more light on distinguishing confidence between the old pairing, the 
new pairings, and the mixed pairings. The paired-associate task was an encoding task and 
not a retrieval from long-term storage task. Because subjects were tested immediately after 
encoding, the paired-associate task is a working memory task. If this is the case, 
monitoring ability may be limited to the working memory capacity of the subject. This 
possibility has yet to be empirically investigated.
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Each group's statistical distance from zero demonstrated the same pattern with the 
paired-associates task as the first task. Each group was able to distinguish what could be 
retrieved from what was a guess. The high and middle groups were overconfident with 
respect to their ability across all three trials, while the low monitoring group did not show 
the same overconfidence. Apparently, the low monitoring group realized that they were 
poor monitors.
The third hypothesis was that there would be a positive correlation between the 
MAI and the NFC. This positive correlation was statistically significant. The subscales on 
Need for Cognition, cognitive persistence, and cognitive confidence were also positively 
correlated with the MAI. Individuals who scored high in Need for Cognitive, cognitive 
confidence and cognitive persistence, saw themselves as highly aware of their 
metacognitive activities, while those with low need for cognition saw themselves as less 
aware during a task. These correlations suggest persistence and confidence may be 
influential in metacognitive activity.
How can one account for these results? The first may be to question the validity of 
the MAI. Does it measure metacognitive awareness and regulation? The instrument is 
certainly reliable. The high correlations between the two factors and the total MAI, 
specifically the coefficient of 0.94 between total MAI and Factor 2, suggests only one 
dimension is being measured. Sperling, (aka Dennison, personal communication. May 24, 
2002) suggests only one dimension is being measured, strategic knowledge. Strategic 
knowledge may include understanding a variety o f different strategies and how to apply 
each strategy to different tasks. If this is the case, the results of this study indicate strategy 
knowledge ^  ^ rej^ed procèss W fqf Cognition. While monitoring may also be
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involved in Need for Cognition, the evidence from this study does not support that 
conclusion. Unfortunately, monitoring may not have been measured by the MAI.
The result is that the groups may have been divided based on strategic knowledge 
than metacognitive monitoring. 1 hose who recognized they had little strategic knowledge 
were not as confident in their ability. On the other hand, those with high strategic 
knowledge were more confident, presumably because they knew more. These particular 
tasks, however, may not have been conducive to the use of that strategic knowledge. This 
would account for the similar confidence ratings and performance scores.
The correlations between the Need for Cognition scale and the MAI indicate that 
strategic knowledge may be involved in whether someone enjoys cognitive activities. An 
individual with a high Need for Cognition may have a better understanding of strategy use 
in cognitive activities. They may also have more strategies available to apply to cognitive 
tasks. While an individual with a low Need for Cognition lacks the appreciation for 
strategic knowledge and it application to cognitive tasks.
Limitations
Limitations of the present study include a concern whether subjects can accurately 
report their own metacognitive monitoring, the effect of social desirability when 
responding to a self-report inventory, and the appropriateness of the MAI as a measure of 
metacognitive monitoring. In addition concerns regarding high variability between groups 
is discussed.
The first limitation of this study is related to the use o f all self-report instruments. 
That is, there is an underlying assumption that people know themselves well enough to 
provide accurate information. This may be particularly difficult when asked to assess what 
one is aware of whij^ f^gaged in a cognitive task.
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Reder (19%; 2001) has suggested that metacognitive regulation is implicit and 
automated, making metacognitive processes beyond the awareness of the individual. If 
metacognition can only be measured indirectly, then a self-report inventory will not be 
effective. I his study may provide support for Reder s assertions. As individuals become 
better at implementing a strategy, the process likely becomes more automated. If 
strategies are beyond conscious control, then they may also be beyond monitoring. In 
addition, the ability to make judgments about strategies in retrieving information may be 
implicit. Reder (2001 ; Schimn, Lovett & Reder, 2001 ) has shown that providing feedback 
promotes changes in strategy, but this may also be implicit. Recognition tasks are highly 
familiar to college students and they may not realize that they need to evaluate their 
performance. Because this was a single exposure project, participants may not have been 
as invested had they been working toward a grade in a course. This could affect not only 
performance on the task itself, but also confidence. Monitoring may have been more 
accurate if subjects felt more invested.
Others concur with Reder's sentiments. Schwartz, Benjamin, and Bjork ( 1997) 
state that immediate metacognitive judgments are unreliable. Judgments such as in the 
feeling-of-knowing paradigm are based on inferences not related to the task, such as 
semantic related information. Confidence judgments then become inferences to whatever 
information can be retrieved. They have tested this hypothesis (Benjamin. Bjork, & 
Schwartz, 1998). In the first study, participants were quizzed on 20 easy to moderate trivia 
questions. They also gave confidence rankings on producing these answers at a future 
time. Participants were given the questions, then a test of geographical knowledge. They 
then wrote all the answers to the trivia test on a blank sheet o f paper. Participants did not 
accurately predict how they would do on the free recall portion of the study. These
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findings are explained in terms of using episodic memory to predict a semantic memory 
task.
In the second half of the experiment participants were asked to predict performance 
in recalling 13 words from six lists. I'hey were tested twice: immediately after the 
presentation of each list, and with delay after the presentation of all six lists. Participant 
predictions did not reflect the primacy and recency effects found in their performance for 
both testing conditions. While this study may explain the results for the feeling-of- 
knowing task in the current study, it does not explain the paired-associate task where 
participants where exposed to several word pairings three times. The paired-associate task 
may be more reflective of working memory, not semantic or episodic memory.
The next concern is the concept of social desirability as it relates to the use of self- 
reports. Social desirability is an attempt to do what is considered socially correct or to do 
what is perceived as what the researcher wants. If college students believe they are being 
assessed on cognitive tasks, they may want to make themselves look better. They may take 
more time in assessing the task and their performance than they would in a more typical 
classroom setting. A college student does not want to give the impression that they are 
incapable o f the task given to them or look deficient. This may be particularly true since 
the subject pool primarily consists of education majors. They may use all they have 
learned so as not to make an impression that they were poor learners.
The third concern is the possible presentation of critical information within the 
MAI. The Metacognitive Awareness Inventory identifies key points regarding monitoring, 
how to do it, and when to monitor. This may present new information to a research 
participant or provide previous metacognitive instruction in a new fashion. The subject 
may gained a greater understanding of metacognition during the presentation of the MAI
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and may have used that in the two tasks that followed. A more conscious attempt at
metacognitive monitoring may have occurred after the presentation of the MAI providing 
these results.
1 he final concern relates to the high variability within each group on confidence 
judgments. One example is the calibration scores on the feeling-of-knowing task (Table 4). 
While the means may be sufficiently different, the standard deviations overlap. High 
variability in monitoring has been found elsewhere (Schraw & Dennison. 1994).
However, Schraw and Dennison found differences between groups in performance as well 
as other indicators.
When dividing participants into three groups using the Need for Cognition scale, 
the same overlapping variance occurred. No statistically significant difference was found 
between groups in confidence ratings or performance on either task, regardless of how the 
groups were divided. The large mean difference on the first trial of the paired-associate 
task between bias scores should indicate differences in monitoring ability (see Figure 4). 
When looking at only the first trial, there was no statistical difference. The variance may 
have occurred as a by-product of this particular sample or perhaps as an artifact of subject 
attempts to implement information provided by the MAI.
Future Directions
The implications o f this work may be important to educators. In particular, there is 
the need for an instrument that can discriminate between individuals in monitoring ability. 
This possibility will be reviewed. In addition, differences in theoretical outlooks are 
examined, such as those outlined by Flavell (1987), and the newer nomenclature used by 
Jacobs and Paris (1987) or Schraw (1994). Finally, cue familiarity and target availability, 
are also reviewed in terms of this and future research.
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Further investigation may show a significant interaction in the interference task 
between the high and low monitoring groups. In order to find differences between high 
and low monitors more stringent cut off points could be established. The high variance 
may come from a larger middle group. Perhaps individuals make inconsistently make use 
of metacognitive knowledge. If groups were divided into quartiles, one might find 
efficient monitoring in the top 25 percent and low metacognitive monitoring in the bottom 
25 percent. The middle 50 percent may simply make inconsistent use of what they know.
Research in this area may provide support to those looking at differences in how 
information is processed (Ahlering & Parker, 1989; Kardash & Noel, 2000; Miner, 1992). 
Individuals with a better understanding of how they think may show differences in how 
they interpret a task given to them. Individuals with greater understanding of 
metacognition should become more comfortable with the task, while those who are less 
aware of their cognitive resources will be less efficient and less proficient.
Another need is an in-depth examination of instnunents that purport to measure 
metacognition. Similar items could be pooled and then compared with related inventories 
to create a better understanding of metacognition and a better means of measuring 
metacognitive awareness. An instrument could be designed specifically to assess 
metacognition and discriminate between individuals. The MAI was designed as a research 
tool investigating monitoring specific tasks such as reading comprehension. It was not 
designed as an assessment tool or to discriminate between individuals.
The MAI was developed within the context of the theoretical structure developed 
by Brown (1987) and Paris and Jacobs (1984). The underpinnings are that metacognitive 
awareness consists of procedural, declarative, and conditional knowledge. Furthermore, 
there is great emphasis on metacognitive regulation in this theory. There are many more
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items on the MAI related to metacognitive control than metacognitive knowledge. These 
theorists appear to focus more on regulating cognitive activity.
The original theory created by Flavell (Flavell, 1987; Flavell & Wellman, 1977) 
focused more on metacognitive knowledge and its underlying variables of person, task, 
and strategy. The Metacognition Awareness Questionnaire developed by Corkill ( 1993), 
and based on the work of Swanson, is founded in Flavell’s theory. The MAQ has been 
helpful when assessing differences in metacognitive ability. Therefore, researchers may 
consider using the MAQ and Flavell’s perspective instead.
The ability to find differences between individuals' metacognitive abilities may be 
related to whether one is measuring metacognitive knowledge or measuring metacognitive 
control. Difference in metacognitive knowledge is measurable. Differences in 
metacognitive control, however, may be much harder to pinpoint (recall that Reder, 1987, 
1996 insists that such processes are beyond conscious control). Therefore, in order to 
discriminate between individuals' at monitoring ability, we first need to determine if 
metacognitive control can be accurately measured.
Recent research has focused on the distinction between feeling-of-knowing 
judgments (FOK) and judgments-of-leaming (JOL) (Plude, Nelson & Scholnick, 1998). A 
FOK asks whether you can information in the future. It is thought to represent a judgment 
of retrieval whether it is in long-term or short-term storage. On the other hand, a JOL is 
thought to reflect whether the information is learned or stored. Nelson claims JOLs are a 
short-term memory judgment (1996).
However, research indicates a JOL is more accurate when the judgment is delayed 
(Dunlosky & Nelson, 1992). Dunlsoky and Nelson found more accurate judgments-of- 
leaming in a paired-associate task when the stimulus and response were presented
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together, but not when only the stimulus was presented alone (1997). JOLs are also 
thought to be associated with strategy use for delayed judgments (Dunlosky & Nelson. 
1994). For example, larger JOLs were found in a paired-associate task when an imagery, 
rather than rote memory, strategy was used. In the second part of the same study greater 
JOLs were reported for distributed practice over massed practice, when the judgment was 
delayed. It was hypothesized that immediate judgments reflect subjects' focusing on 
transient aspects of the task, leading to inaccurate predictions in immediate judgments. If 
judgments-of-leaming need to be delayed to be acciuate, this cast doubt on the JOL as 
being short-term memory judgment or encoding judgment.
Supporters of this distinction rebut by highlighting that each judgment is sensitive 
to different aspects of the task (Carroll, Nelson & Kirwan, 1997). In one study, subjects 
memorized various noun-noun lists in a paired-associate task. Some lists were composed 
of related nouns and others were comprised of unrelated noun-noun pairings. JOL and 
FOK judgments were made at 2 week and 6  week interval tests. Results indicated JOLs 
were more sensitive to lists when the lists they were composed of related material. FOK, 
on the other hand, were sensitive to overlearning. While these judgments may be related to 
different aspects of retrieval, they may not represent different aspects of leaming.
While Nelson and Narens (1990) assert that monitoring judgment reflects how 
accessible a target is, there are an increasing number of studies opposing this view.
Reder’s research has asserted that familiarity with the information is an important factor 
(1987; 1996; Reder & Ritter, 1992). Reder has focused on strategy selection in problem­
solving and response latencies. Her conclusion is that FOKs represent an initial judgment 
of familiarity with the information. Metcalfe. Schwartz, and Jouquim (1993) agree with 
Reder when they compare judgments to the number of presentations of the to-be-leamed
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material. More accurate FOKs were related to the number o f presentations of the material. 
Koriat (1993; 1994; 1995), in examining high FOK judgments with inaccurate responses, 
concluded that FOK judgments represented access to the material, not the actual retrieval 
of information. 1 he work of Bjork and his colleagues (Benjamin, Bjork, & Schwartz.
1998) on the inferential aspects of FOK judgments adds to the consensus that confidence 
judgments are not reflective of direct access to target.
The paired-associate task in the current study with the interference component may 
certainly contribute to Reder's work. Further use of this paradigm may contribute to the 
cue familiarity hypothesis. Observing subject attempts to acquire new information over 
several trials with an interference component may help determine whether the judgment is 
based on familiarity with the information or if the FOK is a measure of target availability. 
If it is a measure of availability there should be less interference between what is encoded 
and what is new, or potentially interfering, information.
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METACOGNITIVE SCALES 
KNOWLEDGE OF COGNITION
1. Declarative knowledge: knowledge about learning and one's cognitive skills and 
abilities
2. Procedural knowledge: knowledge about how to use strategies
3. Conditional knowledge: knowledge about when and whv to use strategies
REGULATION OF COGNITION
1. Planning: planning, goal setting, and allocating resources
2. a) Organizing: implementing strategies and heuristics that help one manage information 
b) Information management; organizing, elaborating, summarizing, and selectively
focusing on important information
3. Monitoring: on-line assessment of one's leaming or strategy use
4. Debugging: strategies used to correct performance errors or assumptions about the task 
or strategy use
5. Evaluation: post-hoc analysis of performance and strategy effectiveness
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QUESTIONS BY CATEGORY
METACOGNITIVE KNOWLEDGE
Declarative Knowledge. Items 5, 10. 12, 16, 17,20,32, 46 (8 ) 
Procedural Knowledge. Items 3, 14,27,33 (4)
Conditional Knowledge. Items 15, 18. 26,29, 35 (5)
METACOGNITIVE REGULATION 
Planning. Items 4 , 6 , 8 , 2 2 , 23,42,45 (7)
Strategy. Items 9. 13,30,31, 37, 39,41, 43,47,48 (10) 
Monitor. Items 1,2, 11,21,28, 34,49 (7)
Debug. Items 25, 40, 44, 51, 52 (5)
Evaluate. Items 7, 19, 24, 36, 38, 50 (6 )
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METACOGNITIVE ASSESSMENT INVENTORY
We would like you to respond to the questions in this packet by indicating how 
true or false each statement is about you. If a statement is always true, write the number 5 
in the blank provided to the right o f each statement. Your responses are scored 
anonymously, so please answer as truthfully as you can.
ALWAYS SOMETIMES SOMETIMES ALWAYS
FALSE FALSE NEUTRAL TRUE TRUE
1 2 3 4 5
1 . 1 ask myself periodically if 1 am meeting my goals.
2 . 1  consider several alternatives to a problem before 1 answer.
3.1 try to use strategies that have worked in the past.
4.1 pace myself while leaming in order to have enough time.
5.1 understand my intellectual strengths and weaknesses.
6 . 1  think about what 1 really need to learn before 1 begin a task.
7 .1 know how well 1 did once I finish a test.
8 . 1  set specific goals before 1 begin a task.
9.1 slow down when I encounter important information.
1 0 . 1  know what kind o f information is most important to leam.
I l l  ask myself if 1 have considered all options when solving a problem.
1 2 . 1  am good at organizing information.
13.1 consciously focus my attention on important information.
14.1 have a specific purpose for each strategy 1 use.
15.1 leam best when I know something about the topic.
16.1 know what the teacher expects me to leam.
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17.1 am good at remembering information.
18.1 use different leaming strategies depending on the situation.
19.1 ask myself if there was an easier way to do things after 1 finish a task.
2 0 . 1 have control over how well 1 leam.
2 1 . 1  periodically review to help me understand important relationships.
_2 2 . 1 ask myself questions about the material before 1 begin.
23.1 think of several ways to solve a problem and choose the best one.
24.1 summarize what I've leamed after 1 finish.
25.1 ask others for help when 1 don't understand something.
26.1 can motivate myself to leam when 1 need to.
27.1 am aware of what strategies 1 use when 1 study.
28.1 find myself analyzing the useftdness of strategies while 1 study.
29.1 use my intellectual strengths to compensate for my weaknesses.
30.1 focus on the meaning and significance of new information.
31.1 create my own examples to make information more meaningful. 
_32.1 am a good judge of how well 1 understand something.
33.1 find myself using helpful leaming strategies automatically.
34.1 find myself pausing regularly to check my comprehension.
35.1 know when each strategy 1 use will be most effective.
36.1 ask myself how well 1 accomplished my goals once I'm finished.
37.1 draw pictures or diagrams to help me understand while leaming.
38.1 ask myself if 1 have considered all options after 1 solve a problem.
39.1 try to translate new information into my own words.
40.1 change strategies when 1 fail to understand.
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4 1 .1 use the organizational structure of the text to help me leam.
4 2 .1 read instructions carefully before 1 begin a task.
43.1 ask myself if what I'm reading is related to what I already know .
4 4 .1 re-evaluate my assumptions when I get confused.
_45.1 organize my time to best accomplish my goals.
46.1 leam more when I am interested in the topic.
47.1 try to break studying down into smaller steps.
48.1 focus on overall meaning rather than specifics.
49.1 ask myself questions about how well I am doing while I am leaming 
something new.
50.1 ask myself if 1 leamed as much as 1 could have once 1 finish a task.
51.1 stop and go back over new infomiation that is not clear.
52.1 stop and reread when 1 get confused.
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Need for Cognition 
Modified form
Please circle whether you agree (T) or disagree (F) with each statement.
T F 1 .1 would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult and important to one that is 
somewhat important but does not require much thought.
T F 2.1 tend to set goals that can be accomplished only by expending considerable 
mental effort.
T F 3. Learning new ways to think doesn’t excite me very much.
T F 4 .1 am hesitant about making important decisions after thinking about them.
T F 5 .1 prefer just to let things happen rather than try to understand why they turned 
out that way.
T F 6 . 1 have difficulty thinking in new and unfamiliar situations.
T F 7. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top does not appeal to
me.
T F S.The notion of thinking abstractly is not appealing to me.
T F 9.1 often think as hard as I have to.
T F 10.1 don’t reason well under pressure.
T F I I I  would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is 
sure to challenge my thinking abilities.
T F 12.1 find little satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours.
T F 13.1 more often talk witli other people about the reasons for and possible
solutions to international problems than about gossip of tidbits of what famous 
people are doing.
T F 14. More often than not more thinking just leads to more errors.
T F 15.1 don’t like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot
of thinking.
T F 16.1 appreciate opportunities to discover the strengths and weaknesses of my own 
reasoning.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
66
T F 17.1 feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot
of mental effort.
T F 18. Thinking is not my idea of fun.
T F 19.1 try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely chance I will
have to think in depth about something.
T F 20.1 prefer watching educational to entertainment programs.
T F 21.1 think best when those around me are very intelligent.
T F 22 .1 prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve.
T F 23.1 would prefer complex to simple problems.
T F 24. Simply knowing the answer rather than understanding the reasons for the
answer to a problem is fine with me.
T F 25. It’s enough for me that something gets the job done, I don’t care how or why
it works.
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Recall Task 
General Knowledge Questions
Example I. What is the name of the horse-like animal with black and white stripes? 
Example 2. What is the last name of the author who wrote “The Old Man and the Sea"?
1. What is the last name of the British admiral who won the Battle of Trafalgar?
2. What is the last name of Dagwood’s boss in the comic strip “Blondi"?
3. For which country is the Drachma the monetary unit?
4. What is the capitol of Jamaica?
5. What is the name of the brightest star in the sky excluding the sun?
6. In what profession was Emmett Kelly?
7. What are people who make maps called?
8 . What are people called who explore caves?
9. What was the name of King Arthur’s sword?
10. What is the last name of the first American author to win the Nobel prize for 
literature?
11. What is the last name of the man who was most responsible for photographing the 
U.S. Civil War?
1 2. What is the last name of the songwriter who wrote the song “I Love Paris’’?
13. What was the last name of the captain of the British ship “Bounty ” when the mutiny
occurred?
14. What was the last name of the female star of the movie “Casablanca ”?
15. What is the name o f the mountain range that separates Asia firom Europe?
16. What is John Kenneth Galbraith’s profession?
17. What is the capitol o f Finland?
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18. Who was the leader of the Argonauts?
19. What is the last name o f the woman who founded the American Red Cross?
20. What is the name of the extinct reptiles known as “Terrible Lizards"?
21. What is the name of the North Star?
22. What was the last name of Billy the Kid?
23. What was the last name of the boxer who was known as the “Manassa Mauler”?
24. What is the capital of New York?
25. What is the last name of the composer of the “Maple Leaf Rag”?
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Answer Sheet 
Recall Task
Confidence Interval
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 Example I.
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 Example 2.
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 1 .
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 2 .
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 3.
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 4.
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 5.
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 6 .
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 7.
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 8 .
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 9.
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 1 0 .
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 1 1 .
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 1 2 .
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 13.
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 14.
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 15.
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 16.
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 17.
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 18.
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 19.
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 2 0 .
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 2 1 .
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 2 2 .
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 23.
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 24.
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 25.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
70
Recognition Task 
General Knowledge Questions
Example 1. What is the name of the horse-like animal with black and white stripes?
a. Tiger d. Mule
b. Zebra e. Gnu
c. Giraffe
Example 2. What is the last name of the author who wrote “The Old Man and the Sea"?
a. Steinbeck d. London
b. Fitzgerald e. Hemingway
c. Faulkner
1. What is the last name of the British admiral who won the Battle of Trafalgar?
a. Nelson d. Powell
b. Napoleon e. Montgomery
c. Mac Arthur
2. What is the last name of Dagwood’s boss in the comic strip “Blond! ”?
a. Smith d. Bowen
b. Dithers e. Swetnam
c. Hill
3. For which country is the Drachma the monetary unit?
a. India d. Greece
b. Iran e. Israel
c. Turkey
4. What is the capitol of Jamaica?
a. Kingston d. Montego
b. Havana e. Barbados
c. Georgetown
5. What is the name of the brightest star in the sky excluding the sun?
a. Polaris d. Pleiades
b. Rigel e. Sirius
c. Andromeda
6 . In what profession was Emmett Kelly?
a. Dancer d. Clown
b. Artist e. Diplomat
c. Archeologist
7. What are people who make maps called?
a. Cartographers d. Calligraphers
b. Ontoiogists e. Ethnographers
c. Choreographers
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8 . What are people called who explore caves?
a. Cave expedition d. Photographer
b. Engineer e. Archeologist
c. Spelunkers
9. What was the name of King Arthur’s sword?
a. Excalibur d. Miriam
b. Galahad e. Thanatos
c. Ivanhoe
10. What is the last name of the first American author to win the Nobel prize for 
literature?
a. Mitchner d. Emerson
b. Thoreau e. Henry
c. Faulkner
11. What is the last name of the man who was most responsible for photographing the 
U.S. Civil War?
a. Weston d. Kodak
b. Carter e. Daguerre
c. Brady
12. What is the last name of the songwriter who wrote the song “I Love Paris”?
a. Berlin d. Hammerstein
b. Porter e. Gershwin
c. Sullivan
13. What was the last name of the captain of the British ship “Bounty ” when the mutiny 
occurred?
a. Bligh d. Cook
b. Ahab e. Queeg
c. Hook
14. What was the last name of the female star of the movie “Casablanca ”?
a. Bacall d. Young
b. Hayward e. Bergman
c. Hepburn
15. V,Tiat is the name of the mountain range that separates Asia from Europe?
a. Salt Range d. Pyrenees
b. Ural e. Sudety
c. Appalachian
16. What is John Kenneth Galbraith’s profession?
a. Photographer d. Economist
b. Architect e. Poet
c. Biographer
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17. What is the capitol of Finland?
a. Copenhagen d. Prague
b. Helsinki e. Stockholm
c. Oslo
18. Who was the leader of the Argonauts?
a. Hercules d. Jason
b. Pericles e. Ulysses
c. Achilles
19. What is the last name of the woman who founded the American Red Cross?
a. Anthony d. Anthony
b. Curie e. Barton
c. Nightingale
20. N^ Tiat is the name of the extinct reptiles known as “Terrible Lizards"?
a. Dinosaurs d. Archaeopteryx
b. Amphibians e. Trilobites
c. Jurassic
2 1. What is the name of the North Star?
a. Sirius d. Betelgeuse
b. Polaris e. Antares
c. Vega
22. \Miat was the last name of Billy the Kid?
a. Bonney d. Cole
b. Blane e. Hickock
c. James
23. What was the last name of the boxer who was known as the “Manassa Mauler"?
a. Marciano d. Willard
b. Clay e. Sullivan
c. Dempsey
24. What is the capital of New York?
a. Rochester d. Buffalo
b. Ithaca e. Syracuse
c. Albany
25. What is the last name of the composer of the “Maple Leaf Rag”?
a. Joplin d. Hammerstein
b. Basie e. Armstrong
c. Sousa
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Answer Sheet 
Recognition Task
Confidence Interval
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 Example 1. A) B) C) D) E)
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 Example 2. A) B) C) D) E)
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 1 . A) B) C D) E)
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 2 . A) B) C D) E)
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 3. A) B) C D) E)
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 4. A) B) C D) E)
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 5. A) B) C D) E)
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 6 . A) B) C D) E)
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 7. A) B) C D) E)
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 8 . A) B) C D) E)
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 9. A) B) C D) E)
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 1 0 . A) B) C D) E)
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 1 1 . A) B) C D) E)
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 1 2 . A) B) C D) E)
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 13. A) B) C D) E)
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 14. A) B) C D) E)
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 15. A) B) C D) E)
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 16. A) B) C D) E)
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 17. A) B) C D) E)
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 18. A) B) C D) E)
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 19. A) B) C D) E)
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 2 0 . A) B) C D) E)
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 2 1 . A) B) C D) E)
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 2 2 . A) B) C D) E)
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 23. A) B) C D) E)
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 24. A) B) c D) E)
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 25. A) B) c D) E)
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Paired-Associate Task Trial 1
(AB)
Learn Test
Banana 17 Orange (23)
Grapefruit 13 Musliroom ( 1 0 )
Potato 26 Pear (16)
Turnip 15 Turnip (15)
Orange 23 Lemon (06)
Cucumber 0 1 Corn (14)
Bean 07 Tangerine (30)
Asparagus 25 Spinach (2 2 )
Carrot 27 Asparagus (25)
Lemon 06 Potato (26)
Mushroom 1 0 Banana (17)
Pineapple 05 Cherry (2 0 )
Spinach 2 2 Kiwi (08)
Kiwi 08 Bean (07)
Com 14 Pineapple (05)
Artichoke 03 Cucumber (0 1 )
Pear 16 Radish ( 1 1 )
Radish 1 1 Carrot (27)
Cherry 2 0 Grapefruit (13)
Tangerine 30 Artichoke (03)
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Learn Test
Bean 07 Pineapple (05)
Kiwi 08 Asparagus (25)
Pear 16 Artichoke (03)
Tangerine 30 Radish ( 1 1 )
Cucumber 0 1 Lemon (06)
Lemon 06 Cherry (2 0 )
Spinach 2 2 Potato (26)
Radish 1 1 Cucumber (0 1 )
Com 14 Banana (17)
Pineapple 05 Kiwi (08)
Orange 23 Mushroom ( 1 0 )
Banana 17 Spinach (2 2 )
Artichoke 03 Bean (07)
Cherry 2 0 Tangerine (30)
Grapefruit 13 Turnip (15)
Carrot 27 Grapefruit (13)
Potato 26 Com (14)
Musliroom 1 0 Pear (16)
Turnip 15 Orange (23)
Asparagus 25 Carrot (27)
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Paired-Associate Task Trial 3
(AC)
Learn Test
Grapefruit 1 2 Com (05)
Carrot 09 Kiwi (2 1 )
Orange 23 Bean (14)
Radish 1 1 Spinach (15)
Turnip 06 Tangerine (30)
Asparagus 07 Cherry (2 0 )
Pineapple 2 2 Cucumber (0 1 )
Kiwi 2 1 Radish ( 1 1 )
Pear 24 Potato (18)
Banana 04 Artichoke (03)
Com 05 Turnip (06)
Lemon 25 Grapefruit ( 1 2 )
Cherry 2 0 Orange (23)
Potato 18 Asparagus (07)
Spinach 15 Mushroom ( 1 0 )
Tangerine 30 Pineapple (2 2 )
Artichoke 03 Lemon (25)
Bean 14 Banana (04)
Cucumber 0 1 Pear (24)
Mushroom 1 0 Carrot (09)
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Paired-Associate Task 
Answer Sheet
Confidence Interval
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 1 .
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 2 .
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 3.
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 4.
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 5.
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 6 .
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 7.
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 8 .
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 9.
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 1 0 .
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 1 1 .
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 1 2 .
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 13.
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 14.
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 15.
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 16.
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 17.
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 18.
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 19.
0 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 2 0 .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
APPENDIX II
TABLES AND FIGURES REFERENCED IN TEXT
78
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
79
Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations o f  Groups on MAI Factor 2
Group M SD
High Monitor 146.67 8.89
Mid Monitor 125.46 3.96
Low Monitor 107.96 5.47
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Table 2
Bias Score M eans on Feeiing-of-knowing Task
Group M SD
High Monitor 0.09 0.17
Med Monitor 0 . 1 1 0 . 2 0
Low Monitor 0.05 0.15
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Table 3
Bias Means on Paired-associates Task
Group
AB ABr AC
M SD M SD M SD
High 0.03 0.13 0.06 0 . 1 1 0.05 0.13
Medium 0 . 1 0 0.18 0.04 0.19 0.06 0 . 2 0
Low 0.05 0.15 0.04 0 . 1 1 0.03 0.16
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Table 4
Calibration Means on Feelinp-of-knowing Task
Group M ^
High Monitor 0.46 0.55
Med Monitor 0.51 0.55
Low Monitor 0.50 0.55
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Table 5
Calibration Means on Paired-associates Task
Group M SD
AB
High Monitor 1.24 0.88
Medium Monitor 1 .34 0.80
Low Monitor 1.48 1 .20
ABr
High Monitor 1.49 0.62
Medium Monitor 1.22 0.70
Low Monitor 1.49 0.78
AC
Higli Monitor 1.67 0.75
Medium Monitor 1.26 1.15
Low Monitor 1.19 1.00
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Table 6
Means and Standard Deviations o f  Groups on MAI Factor 1
Group M SD
High monitor 71.81 4.60
Mid monitor 63.14 1.39
Low monitor 54.23 5.97
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Table 7
Means and Standard Deviations o f Groups on Total MAI Score
Group M m
High monitor 214.60 10.06
Mid monitor 189.04 6.22
Low monitor 164.48 10.22
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Table 8
Correlation Matrix Between MAI and NFC
MAI Factor
1
Factor
2
NFC Persist Conf
MAI
Factor 1 0.78*
Factor 2 0.94* 0.53*
NFC 0.55* 0.47* 0.49*
Persist 0.42* 0.35* 0.38* 0 .8 6 *
Confid 0.51* 0.51* 0.42* 0.80* 0.53*
Complex 0.48* 0.38* 0.45* 0 .8 8 * 0.62* 0.58*
* p < 0 . 0 1
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Figure 1
Bias Means bv Ability Group
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Figure 2
Calibration Means bv Ability Group
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Figure 3
Paired-associates Bias Means
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